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 While age has been studied as a factor of voting tendency, the academic discussions on 
minimum voting age and what affects its change are seriously lacking. This research contends 
that youth involvement in social movements impacts the political decision to lower the voting 
age. The South Korean case poses a question on why, among the 20 bills lowering the voting age 
introduced during the past decade, only the 2019 bill passed. The across-time study compiles 
every media-reported youth involvement in social movements over time, in relation to the final 
legislative status of voting age bills introduced each time. The across-politician study compares 
youth presence in each constituency with its lawmaker’s reaction to the voting age bill. These 
suggest that once youth involvement increases to a common experience among the youth group, 
both politicians and parties become more conscious of the higher stakes of the voting age bills 
and reach a bipartisan consensus for prioritized passage. 
국문초록 
 정치학 연구에서 연령은 투표 성향의 맥락으로 한정되어왔으며, 선거연령과 그 하향 
요인에 대한 담론은 드물다. 본 연구는 최근 선거연령을 낮춘 대한민국을 예시로 지난 10 여년 간 
발의된 20 건의 선거연령 하향 법안 중 왜 2019 년 안만 통과할 수 있었는지에 대해 탐구한 결과, 
선거연령 하향을 이끄는 결정적인 요인은 청소년의 사회 참여라고 판단했다. 종단연구 부분은 
월별 청소년 참여 보도 내용과 각 시점에 논의된 법안의 진전을, 횡단연구 부분은 지역구 별 
청소년 인구, 비율, 참여도와 각 국회의원의 선거연령 하향 지지도를 비교한다. 청소년의 사회 
참여 경험이 빈도와 규모 면에서 보편화 수준으로 증가함에 따라 그들의 민주적 역량에 대한 
인식이 변화하며, 정치권은 선거연령 하향을 당파적 이해를 넘어 당위적 과제로 인식하게 된다. 
정당과 개별 의원이 그 중대성을 의식한 결과 선거연령 하향은 준초당적 사안으로 부상하여 
비로소 우선적 통과 요건을 갖추게 된다. 
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The history of democracy is the history of enfranchisement. However, the universal 
suffrage that most contemporary liberal democracies claim to have reached is not truly universal, 
as the presence of minimum voting age disenfranchises the youth.1 Some say that lowering the 
voting age is the final step toward universal suffrage, but there exists a time lag where each state 
gradually accepts the change. This is why different liberal democracies have had different voting 
ages over time and lowered them within their contexts. For example, the United States lowered 
its voting age to 18 through the Twenty-sixth Amendment to the Constitution in 1971. 
On December 27, 2019, the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea passed 
amendments to the Public Official Election Act, lowering the national voting age from 19 to 18.2 
As Speaker Moon Hee-sang3 struck the gavel amid the wrestling lawmakers4 and flying placards 
in the chamber, the decades-long gridlock was finally over. South Korea5 became the last to join 
its peer liberal democracies with a voting age of 18 or lower. As of 2021, all members of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have a national voting age of 
18, except Austria, 16. But what factors motivate lawmakers to lower the voting age? While 
dozens of bills lowering the voting age from 19 to 18 had been introduced, the final passage in 
2019 took a decade. The interesting contrast between the unsuccessful and successful ones 
suggests that lowering the voting age is more than just partisan dynamics or negotiation of 
interests. South Korea in the 2010s exemplifies how youth involvement in social movements 
demonstrates the political capacity of the youth and adds salience to the voting age agenda, 
which in turn pushes the lawmakers to prioritize the passage of the bill. 
Identifying what increases the likelihood of lowering the voting age is important for two 
major reasons. First, the discussion of lowering the voting age could arise in any liberal 
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democracy, endlessly. South Korea started discussing lowering the voting age from 19 to 18 
right after it was lowered from 20 to 19 in 2005, and the 2019 legislation was immediately 
followed by the demand to even eliminate the age restriction. Eighteen is not a terminal standard, 
and the voting age agenda is rather continuous. In fact, lowering the voting age to 16 has been 
not only a timely issue in regional politics but also a presidential campaign platform in the US, 
and some European parliaments have already started the formal discussion. Due to such 
universal and continuous characteristics of this particular topic, political scientists should be 
aware of the prerequisites or precursors in order to be able to tell when and where this significant 
change will likely take place in the future. 
Second, knowing what elements other than immediate votes motivate politicians could 
provide meaningful insight into topics broader than voting age itself. Lowering the voting age is 
not just an amendment to a law, but an enfranchisement of political minorities. Due to the 
longstanding age discrimination, youths have been reduced to politically incapable dependencies. 
Even in many contemporary liberal democracies, youths are deprived of their political rights 
such as campaigning, running for offices, and of course voting. Therefore, lowering the voting 
age is in the continuity of enfranchisement since granting them political rights partially resolves 
such discrimination. Furthermore, the findings of this research could provide meaningful insight 
into the politics of enfranchisement in general, which requires a more comprehensive 
explanation for factors impacting politicians than votes. To elaborate, disenfranchised minorities, 
youths in this case, have no direct power to punish or award the politicians until they are finally 
enfranchised. Without other factors that urge the lawmakers to stand with the powerless, the 
intuitive electoral politics cannot explain the seemingly altruistic stance they take. The series of 
recent South Korean voting age bills gives important insight on what extra-electoral conditions 
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bring the gridlock closer to an end and enable enfranchisement. While this is especially about a 
gridlock that concerns franchise, the extra-electoral motives might also shed light on the 
representation of different minority groups left out of the majoritarian electoral politics. 
Intuitively, politicians are thought to pursue practical interests in accordance with their parties 
and constituents that actually determine their reelection, but they sometimes act based on their 
conscience over partisan interest when it comes to issues concerning morality typically around 
minority rights. In sum, the study on youths’ impact on lowering the voting age might speak to a 
process where politicians are motivated to act on behalf of the minorities based on their 
conscience rather than direct or immediate incentives. 
However, neither youth involvement nor voting age has sufficiently been discussed in 
political science. Conducting the research, I have noticed the scarcity of both youth literature and 
voting age literature which respectively correspond to the independent and dependent variables. 
First, most political science literature that address youths define them as “young adults.” Youths 
in political context have been discussed as young voters or often college students typically over 
the voting age. The literature that define youths as minors under the voting age rather belonged 
to the disciplines like developmental studies, pedagogy, or psychology, which were simply too 
far from relevant. It was disappointing to realize that there are only a few credible political 
science literature that seriously address their capacity to independently impact the political 
process, while they have always been doing so all over the world. Throughout history, youths 
have played a significant role in major social movements (Nordås and Davenport 2013). This is 
not only about college students but also teenagers seeking social changes, especially in South 
Korea where teenagers have led most major historic movements from the Japanese occupation to 
the military rule to the 21st Century. However, the contribution of marginalized teenagers has 
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not as seriously discussed in scholarly settings. To summarize, neither teenagers themselves nor 
their substantial political contribution has been represented in the discipline of political science. 
Voting age literature is lacking as well. Most political scientists do discuss voter age 
typically in terms of voting tendency, but rarely pay attention to those who are below the voting 
age. A few peer-reviewed journal articles do discuss voting age, but as an independent variable, 
not a dependent variable. In other words, even within the limited pool, voting age studies focus 
primarily on the consequence of lowering the voting age, not the cause. For example, Zeglovits 
and Zandonella (2013) hypothesize that lowering the voting age increases the political 
participation of the youth. In this case, lowering the voting age is exogenous to youth 
involvement. However, there is virtually no previous attempt to explain lowering the voting age 
with youth involvement. Therefore, this research questions the cause of lowering the voting age, 
or what motivates the lawmakers to vote in favor of lowering the voting age, focusing on the 
significance of youth involvement impacting the legislature outside the traditional partisan 
dynamics centered around politicians. This examines lowering the voting age to be endogenous 
to youth involvement: in other words, the possibility where youth involvement could be the 
cause as well as the effect of lowering the voting age. 
In sum, political science researches of youth involvement as an explanation for the 
success in lowering the voting age has been almost non-existent despite its importance, and this 
research attempts to fill the gap. In doing so, it takes a counterintuitive approach and argues that 
youths play a substantial role in the passage of the bill lowering the voting age. Lowering the 
voting age is typically considered a partisan project. To elaborate, liberal parties are more likely 
to support the bill lowering the voting age because it will invite more young people who tend to 
vote liberal. However, this does not apply to the 2019 passage in South Korea, the most recent 
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case as of now where a liberal democracy lowered its national voting age. Therefore, this 
research challenges the intuitive partisan politics explanation and suggests that the behavior of 
youths themselves has to do with the passage of the bill. This is significant because it not only 
explains the political process of lowering the voting age more universally accurately but also 
suggests that this is what youths earned rather than given as a byproduct of partisan contestation. 
Throughout history, enfranchisement has been thought to be a result of politicians’ pursuit of 
practical interest disguised as a benevolent gift from the just. However, this research 




 Multiparty System 
 In order to understand the political context of the voting age bills, it is crucial to 
understand the South Korean multiparty politics in the 2010s. South Korea is a unitary state with 
a presidential system. After a series of dictatorships that followed the Korean War, it became a 
liberal democracy in 1987 when the new constitution included direct election and established 
liberal democratic institutions like the rule of law and peaceful transfer of power. South Korea’s 
unicameral legislature the National Assembly resides on Yeouido Island between the Han River 
banks. Its 300 seats are broken down into the first-past-the-post district seats and proportional 
representation. While the specific rules have differed over time, proportional representation has 
been a key aspect of post-democratic politics. The particular version of proportional 
representation relevant to this study was adopted in 20041 (National Law Information Center 
2004). A voter separately votes for a district candidate and a party on a ballot, and the latter 
result independently divides the proportional representation seats that occupy about a sixth of the 
National Assembly. Proportional representation leads to a multiparty system (Duverger 1964) 




Figure 1. Lineage of National Assembly Parties on Ideological Spectrum 
 South Korean politics in the 2010s exemplifies the dynamic nature of its multiparty 
system, characterized by very frequent merges and splits. In 2012, the 19th National Assembly 
was inaugurated with three main parties: the Justice Party (left),2 the Democratic Party (center-
left),3 and the Liberty Korea Party (right).4 “Phase one” lasted almost the entire 19th National 
Assembly, normalizing the longstanding three-party politics. In 2016, Democrats in the pro-Kim 
Dae-jung wing based in the Honam region and a rising technocrat Ahn Cheol-soo divorced the 
party and established the People’s Party (center) right before the 20th National Assembly 
election, successfully opening “phase two” thanks to the election victory.5 Months later, 
President Park Geun-hye (LKP) was impeached over Choigate, a scandal where Park illegally 
delegated the presidential authorities to her secretive friend and coerced the conglomerates to 
lobby her private foundations. In January 2017, LKP moderates abandoned Park and founded the 
Bareunmirae Party (center-right),6 opening “phase three.”7 The BMP self-proclaimed the anti-
Park alternative for the conservatives, but soon lost half of its seats to the LKP during the 19th 
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and support LKP’s Hong Joon-pyo in order to temporarily unite and defeat Moon Jae-in, a 
Democrat. As Yoo refused, they returned to the LKP to support Hong, shifting to “phase four.” 
Halved in size, the BMP decided to combine with People’s, the other centrist minority party. In 
2018, the People’s mainstream joined the BMP, and the pro-Kim wing remained due to its 
incompatibility with the conservative ideology and loyalty to its regional base.8 This is “phase 
five” that lasted until early 2020. When the voting age bill was finally passed in December 2019, 
five main parties, Justice (left), Democratic (center-left), People’s (center), the BMP (center-
right), and the LKP (right) were making up the ideological spectrum of the National Assembly. 
 Legislative Process 
 Due to the frequent merges and splits, the 20th National Assembly had never had a 
majority party. The partisan turmoil around Park’s impeachment and its aftermath prevented the 
parties from reaching consensus under the legislative process due to gridlocks. When a bill is 
introduced by either the executive branch or 10 or more lawmakers, it is then allocated to a 
relevant committee (NLIC 2019).9 Committees, both standing and special, consist of lawmakers 
from different parties, and the chairs are not necessarily from the majority party, unlike the US 
Congress. The initial committee allocations, however, are not final. Each committee can discuss 
bills at subcommittees then bring them to the full committee floor, or send them to other 
committees. They are then sent to the Legislation and Judiciary Committee, then to the Plenary 
Session, the final discretion. Although both the Plenary Session and the committees decide based 
on majority rule, following debates (NLIC 2019), there are ways opposing parties can delay this 
process other than votes. Highly contested bills are conventionally excluded from the committee 
agenda without bipartisan consent, and opponents can even boycott their committee attendance, 
delaying the process. 
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II. Lowering the Voting Age 
 South Korea’s initial voting age 21 was set by the United States Army Military 
Government in Korea, prior to the First National Assembly election in 1948 (NLIC 1948). The 
1960 amendment to the Constitution then lowered the voting age to 20 (NLIC 1960). The 
discussion to lower the voting age in the liberal democratic context began right after the 
democratization in 1987, which also transferred the authority to set the voting age from the 
Constitution to statutes. For the first time, Democrats brought their year-long project to lower the 
voting age from 20 to 18 to the National Assembly committee floor in 1992, while the LKP 
resisted (National Assembly of the Republic of Korea 1992).1 The dispute lasted in the 21st 
century and the lawmakers compromised to lower the voting age from 20 to 19 in 2005 (NLIC 
2005). However, the advocates continued to demand further lowering the voting age to 18, and 
the political discussion shortly reconvened. Throughout the last decade, protests, petitions, party 
platforms, executive proposals, and most importantly, legislative attempts reflect this demand, 
but actually passing the voting age bill had been extremely challenging. It took 14 years to take 
another year down, meeting what was then global standards for liberal democracies. 
 
Table 1. List of Bills Lowering the Voting Age 2012-2019 
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This study concerns the period between the inauguration of the 19th National Assembly 
in May 2012 and the final passage of the bill under the 20th National Assembly in December 
2019. Inaugurated in the final year of the Lee Administration (LKP), the LKP had been the 19th 
National Assembly majority except for a short period of time. The 20th National Assembly had 
never had a majority party, even after Park’s impeachment and the inauguration of President 
Moon in 2017. The 19th and 20th National Assembly lawmakers had introduced 20 bills 
lowering the national voting age from 19 to 18. However, the first 19, with one bill passing a 
subcommittee once, all failed to reach the Plenary Session, and only the last bill introduced in 
April 2019 was able to make it to the Plenary Session, and passed in December. This leads to the 
research question: why did the 2019 bill passed while other voting age bills did not? The 
likelihood of the passage of a voting age bill serves as the dependent variable here. In other 
words, this is answering what is required for the support sufficient to bring the bill closer to the 
final passage. 
Again, the 20 bills differed in their final results: introduced, passed a committee, and 
passed the Plenary Session. While the differing outcomes seemingly coincide with the 
administration change to the Democratic Party, this explains neither the five unsuccessful bills 
under the new administration nor the absence of a majority party in the 20th National Assembly 
since its inauguration in 2016. The table demonstrates that the Democratic control over the 
presidency was limited to the executive branch and the National Assembly still lacked a 
majority. In fact, an inauguration of a new president or change in partisan composition in the 
National Assembly cannot significantly resolve the recurring gridlocks. Also, given that any 
party-level opposition could endlessly delay the process, any passage requires bipartisan2 
consensus anyway. In other words, the partisan control over government branches had no 
Cho 14 
meaningful impact on increasing the likelihood of the voting age bill passing the National 
Assembly. Therefore, this study aims to provide a more comprehensive explanation than the 
simplistic partisan approach. The empirical evidence further chapters will lay out indicate that 




III. Youth Involvement in Social Movements 
 This study hypothesizes that growing youth involvement in social movements tends to 
increase the likelihood of a bill lowering the voting age to pass. Prior to the theoretical 
explanation of this potential process, this chapter first introduces the brief history of youth 
involvement, especially in South Korea, in order to provide context for the argument of how 
youth involvement was responsible for this legislation. 
 Youths have been the frontline of social movements in modern democracies around the 
world (Earl et al 2017). Although social movements are typically associated with college 
campuses, youths well below the voting age both then and now have been another significant 
element of the social changes. Many American youths in the 1960s participated in the Civil 
Rights Movement, especially conveying their direct voice on the oppressive and discriminatory 
school environment (Schumaker 2019). Meanwhile, French youths led in the historic 1968 
Revolution, a counter-culture movement that reformed the old family norms and educational 
institutions that directly related to their lives. The movement spread to the rest of the Western 
world and other liberal democracies like Japan, and so did the youth involvement in such 
equivalents. Even now, youths remain active in social movements around the world when it 
comes to the wide range of contemporary agenda. In the US, many youths continue to mobilize 
around racial justice, immigration, and gun control in response to school shootings. In different 
regimes, youths are contributing to the ongoing democratization movements, as in Hong Kong 
where youth activists substantially led the 2014 and 2019 protests, largely impacting the city’s 
politics. Youths also have become icons of the 2021 democratization movement in Myanmar, 
echoing the significant youth presence in dramatic historic events. The worldwide climate 
activism is also led mainly by youth activists and their organizations. All of these examples are 
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youths, below the respective voting ages, having consistently impacted the institution of social 
movements. 
 Youth involvement in modern Korea dates back to the Japanese Occupation from 1910 to 
1945 where the youth played a significant role in the independence movement.1 One of the most 
famous independence activists who led the biggest rally throughout the period was 16, just like 
the countless number of her peer followers. Also, the 1929 Gwangju Student Independence 
Movement was led exclusively by regional high school students, sparked by the colonialist 
school environment. Youths continued to act in social movements after the independence and the 
Korean War challenging the series of dictatorships: both the 1960 movement against the election 
fraud against the first South Korean president Syngman Rhee2 and the 1980 and 1987 
movements against the final military dictator Chun Doo-hwan. All of these examples are invoked 
by the proponents of lowering the voting age, as evidence to back the claim that youths are 
politically capable. This rhetoric is demonstrated on both the youth NGO statements and the 
National Assembly committee minutes. 
 Even after the democratization, youths have participated in social movements regarding 
various contemporary agendas such as diplomacy, trade, and politics. In 2002, for example, a 
mass anti-US movement emerged over a US Army tank accident that killed two middle school 
girls, protesting against the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) which was then deemed 
responsible for the de facto extraterritoriality granted to the US soldiers. Middle and high school 
students about the same age as the victims voluntarily joined the protest (Kim 2003). Although 
youth involvement is not limited to the issues that directly impact youths, this exemplifies how 
they have exerted their voice as the party directly related to the matter (dangsaja).3 Youths 
engaging in social movements as directly involved parties resonates through different times and 
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places. In fact, many of the examples above, desegregation and school shootings in the US and 
the tension between Korean and Japanese students amid the colonial rule, have to do with the 
dangsaja cause. This continues in the 2014 Sewol Ferry Accident where hundreds of high school 
students were sacrificed largely due to the misleading emergency announcement directing them 
to “stay still” (gamanhi isseura). This sounded like a common situation where adults silence 
youths, enraging many, and eventually made a slogan for the youth-led anti-Park events. The 
worldwide movement around climate also counts as a case of dangsaja involvements, which 
inherently impacts the youth the most. 
The particular wave of youth involvement especially relevant to this study is the protest 
from 2016 to 2017 demanding the impeachment of former president Park. As briefly mentioned 
above, this has to do with a political scandal around Park and her secretive friend Choi, who used 
the power to fulfill personal interests including her daughter’s college admissions. This, again, 
triggered many South Korean youths undergoing the rigorous college admissions process which 
is meant to be strictly merit-based. Directly impacted by the grave violation of the egalitarian 
principle of the college admissions process that promises social mobility through education, 
youths emerged as the unprecedently significant portion of the mass protests. This experience is 
imperative because it functioned as a momentum of youth involvement even after the 
impeachment. A collective sense of having their voice heard and successfully inducing a huge 
political reform was shared among youths fuel further involvement in social movements 
(Youniss et al 2002). 
Given the context of the rising youth involvement in social movements in the 2010s 
South Korea, this research contends that the increase in youth involvement is a more reasonable 
explanation for the passage of the bill lowering the voting age, ending the decade-long gridlock. 
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Integrated with the relevant literature, this study hypothesizes that domestic growth in youth 
involvement increases the likelihood of legislation lowering the voting age. Growing youth 
involvement demonstrates the political capacity of the youth. Once the discussion of lowering 
the voting age gains salience through this, parties and politicians put their moral obligation at 
stake if they continue to drag their feet. Such conditions lead to the bipartisan consensus to 
prioritize the voting age agenda which is sufficient to push through the final passage of the bill. 
Social movements are a significant part of democratic politics, setting political agenda 
and affecting party platforms. This most intuitive form of grassroots politics involves multiple 
political institutions such as media, interest groups, and political parties. Youth involvement in 
social movements can be conceptualized as how spontaneously and substantially youths have 
participated in those social movements. The examination of how these factors lead to the 
successful passage of the bill lowering the voting age will follow. Youth involvement will be 
assessed based on how impactful the youths were in such social movements, including but not 
limited to voting age issues. To elaborate, youths are impactful when the movements are big 
enough and they have actual say in those movements. This potentially includes their overall 
participation rate, role in organizations, and success in public opinion and policy change. The 
multi-faceted approach from youth-led organizations and events to the percentage of youths in 
social movements will holistically assess their impact over time. By doing so, the youth 
movement is framed as another wave of social movements, following the preceding ones such as 
women’s rights, Civil Rights, and LGBTQ+ rights. 
 Youth involvement has been acknowledged to demonstrate youths’ impact in asserting 
their political opinion through participation. Listed as “core participants of a wide variety of 
social movements” (Almeida 2019), youth involvement and leadership have been recognized as 
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essential to social movements in modern politics (Earl et al 2017). The literature suggest that 
there are elements that make youth involvement impactful. First, youth involvement has a long-
lasting effect on the future constituency, as youths politicize themselves through their experience 
in social movements which amplifies and lasts after they become adults (Youniss et al 2002). 
Given this long-lasting impact, partisan politics will pay attention to youth involvement as an 
indicator of their potential citizenship. Second, youth involvements tend to be spontaneously 
motivated based on the participants’ genuine needs. As mentioned above, youths around the 
world have spoken up especially when it comes to the agenda of their direct interests, such as the 
1990s Japanese student movement that protested the repressive school regulations (Takahashi 
and Takeuchi 1993). This gives their agenda more salience and helps mobilize their peer 
participants, which is a way youths can be impactful in social movements. 
The literature also counter the “youth deficit model” that regards youth as immature and 
thus politically incapable. This deficit model reduces youth engagement by “assuming that youth 
are not interested in politics, and denying youth agency in their own political socialization” (Earl 
et al 2017). Building on that youths are in fact impactful enough to politically organize 
themselves, scholars argue that spontaneous youth participation can make meaningful long-
lasting contributions to social movements. Despite the institutional constraints that youths face as 
minors, scholars suggest that youths are capable of exerting their voice through various channels 
(Kwon 2013). In sum, the literature support that youth involvement, spontaneously organized 
and continuously carried out, can overcome the restrictive nature of adult-dominated politics and 
demonstrate the political capacity of the youth. Youth involvement, despite some preconceived 
notions of constraint, has been impactful in social movements in different societies. Since youth 
involvement has been significant over time and yielded long-lasting impacts in South Korea 
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during the previous decade, lawmakers recognized the political capacity of the youth and the 
urgency of the voting age agenda. 
This leads to the next point: social movements literature explains how protests change 
peoples’ perception of their agenda and bring legislative responses. Branton et al (2015) 
hypothesize that temporal and spatial exposure to minority movements turns people favorable. 
This relates to how social movements engender support outside the group that is directly 
involved. Gillion (2012) explains how minority involvement in social movements leads to 
congressional response at the level of individual representatives, based on the empirical data 
from the United States Congress roll-call votes. This introduces conventional wisdom that 
politicians pay attention to big protests in order to maintain accountability mainly for reelection. 
Here, partisan platforms are also addressed as an alternative explanation. While acknowledging 
that the Democratic Party was overall more responsive to minority activism than the GOP, the 
consistent trend throughout Congress where individual votes have responded to minority 
activism validates the hypothesis. The above findings provide relevant empirical evidence that 
social movements turn those who were exposed favorable to their agenda and often lead to 
legislative responses. 
This is based on the scholarly consensus that legislators closely pay attention to their 
constituents and reflect their calls beyond partisan interests. Bergan and Cole (2015) demonstrate 
that lawmakers reflect their direct relationships with their constituents on their legislative votes. 
In addition to reelection, the professional duty also motivates lawmakers to represent their 
constituents. While the occupational obligation might not be the definitive answer to this case, it 
is noteworthy that the partisan motive around reelection is not the only factor, thus enabling the 
lawmakers to represent youth citizens as well. Adding onto this, Bishin (2004) argues that 
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legislator behavior is rather complicated and multi-dimensional so that it cannot be reduced to 
partisan dynamics only. The literature addresses the aspect of rich representation of the 
constituents which has been overlooked. There are direct and indirect effects deciding the 
lawmaker's behavior, and constituent ideology is one factor. Given that constituent ideology can 
affect lawmakers’ behavior, youths can also exert their political significance to their 
representatives outside the traditional paths such as political parties and lobbying. 
In sum, once youths successfully mobilize and demonstrate their political capacity, 
legislators are likely to pay attention to their voice, despite the institutional constraint that they 
can neither reward nor penalize the legislators immediately. Even without suffrage prior to 
lowering the voting age, youths can affect the lawmakers’ behavior outside the traditional path of 
partisan politics by claiming their political significance through social movements. In doing so, 
their involvement demonstrates their political capacity and raises the stake of the most relevant 
agenda, the bill lowering the voting age. Again, the lack of literature directly speaking to this 
very specific sort of legislation made conducting this research felt like building a house from 
scratch, or with bricks brought from miles away. However, this study will focus on linking the 
first and second parts of this literature review and finding how youth involvement empowers 
social movements so that they can induce favorable legislative responses. 
This study hypothesizes that the higher stakes of the voting age agenda pressure parties 
and lawmakers. First of all, party image has long been perceived as a factor that voters take into 
account. For example, voters associate parties with images such as religiosity (Campbell et al 
2011), urban and rural (Walsh 2012), race (Stephens-Dougan 2016), and unemployment solution 
(Healy and Lenz 2014). Regardless of how many of those attributes the parties actually have, it is 
commonly accepted that there are party images shared among voters significantly affect how 
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they vote. Likewise, as the youth involvement in social movements grows in significance over 
time, parties focus on whether their images are youth-friendly, which depends on their stance on 
the bill lowering the voting age. To elaborate, the youth-friendly images to appeal to the newest 
constituents who will be shortly enfranchised, motivates parties to demonstrate their support for 
the bill. This starkly differs from the intuitive explanation that Democrats are intrinsically in 
favor of lower the voting age in order to get more votes. The new explanation applies to not only 
the Democratic Party but also almost every party. In fact, all parties, even the most consistent 
opponent the LKP, reached the bipartisan consensus to vote in favor of the bill in 2018. The 
shared motive here was to build a youth-friendly party image and attract new voters, since their 
risk of gaining negative images associated with the reluctance to lower the voting age outweighs 
the risk of losing vote shares due to the enfranchisement of more liberal voters. This explains 
why those parties joined the commitment to lower the voting age instead of dragging their feet. 
As domestic youth involvement grows, parties become more and more concerned with their 
images over time. One image that deters many young votes is “oldness” (Seok et al 2019). In 
fact, the LKP leadership blames its negative reputation associated with this particular negative 
image for its loss in the 2020 National Assembly election, and is seeking ways to abandon it: not 
only the LKP but other parties put effort to do the same. Because the opponents of the voting age 
bill resemble the “authoritative old generation,” their reluctance to lower the voting age is 
significantly associated with this particular negative image. 
Although their images have always mattered, the motivation to support the bill was not 
strong enough when the youth involvement in social movement was not as imperative as it was 
around the time when the bill finally passed. Once the issue became imperative, the motive to 
demonstrate a youth-friendly image peaked together and the parties included their commitment 
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to lower the voting age into their protocols (dangnon) which enabled the bipartisan consensus in 
2019 to eventually pass the bill. The rising youth involvement demonstrated the youths’ interest 
in politics and readiness to assess party images based on which stance each party took regarding 
the issue of lowering the voting age. To elaborate, when youth involvement was limited to a few 
politically active youths, voters are less aware of the fact that youths are involved in social 
movements at all. However, once it increases to a common experience, in frequency, scale, and 
quality, voters are more likely to be informed about youth involvement. This adds another way 
voters can assess party images, which party leaderships keenly respond to. In sum, the rise of 
youth involvement past the threshold demonstrates youths’ potential political capacity and 
motivates parties to adjust their priorities and support the bill lowering the voting age and appeal 
to not only voters but also the incoming wave of citizenship. 
In addition to the party-level platforms, the degree of youth involvement might also affect 
individual lawmakers. While the 47 proportional representatives are affected by their party 
protocols or the overall national youth involvement, those who are representing the 253 
constituencies have to be aware of their future voters as well. Each constituency consists of 
between 100,000 and 200,000 voters, but the generational makeup starkly differs due to the 
South Korean migration pattern where the rural young tend to move to the capital area 
(ichonhyangdo). For example, the mega constituencies in the remote mountain regions that cover 
up to five rural counties consist of mostly the old generation, whereas most urban constituencies 
that cover down to one-third district (gu) consist of youths and their relatively young parents. 
This is why redistricting commonly happens when youths reach the voting age and enter into the 
eligible voting population: rural constituencies merge and the urban ones split. Constituencies 
with more youth population consist of more schools, or regional bases that youths can gather for 
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collective action. Those who are representing such constituencies are more likely to be aware of 
those youth citizens as well as their agenda. Put differently, the significance of youth 
involvement in inducing the legislative momentum to pass the bill lowering the voting age will 
be reflected in the individual lawmakers’ response. 
 In sum, this study hypothesizes that once a domestic youth involvement grows past the 
threshold, the well-demonstrated political capacity of the youth will confer salience to the timely 
voting age agenda. The continued reluctance of the parties and lawmakers will raise the stakes of 
their moral obligation, so that most parties will consent to prioritize the passage of the bill 
lowering the voting age. The party- and lawmaker-level of this process will be empirically 




IV. Across-time Study 
The across-time study will examine the correlation between the national youth 
involvement over time and the legislative steps the bills from corresponding periods reached. 
Here, the step each bill lowering the voting age reached indicates how close it got to the final 
passage, which requires bipartisan support this study is looking for. In order to do so, it is 
necessary to first assess the national youth involvement over time. There have been separate 
researches assessing youth involvement and social movements, but not youth involvement in 
social movements. While they provide no direct precedent, they do provide insights essential to 
assessing youth involvement in social movements in a comprehensive manner. 
First, Mazumder (2018) measures social movements to demonstrate how social 
movements continue to shape politics The protest data from the New York Times until 1965 is 
collected, deliberately setting the period to prevent other factors from getting involved. However, 
the civil rights protests are counted on a binary basis, considering only whether or not it 
happened, disregarding how many people participated, how long it lasted, or how much attention 
it gathered. In order to assess the impact of social movements, it could be more comprehensive to 
include such aspects. Next, Branton et al (2015) examine how immigration rallies affected public 
opinion, based on the evidence the survey results before and after the events. Their research 
examines both temporal and spatial exposures to the protests, taking the period of protests and 
their effects to convince that, post-protest respondents were likely to support the content of the 
protests. They also considered the spatial exposure, concluding that the closer the respondents 
live the more likely they become supportive of the agenda. Temporal exposure was measured 
binarily conducting surveys before and after the protests, and spatial exposure was measured 
based on the location of protests on the county level. Therefore their measure is more 
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comprehensive than Mazumder that measured protests by simple counts. This discerns which 
event affected the public more clearly, and the survey data was effectively demonstrated so that 
the readers can intuitively compare the effects of the protests. However, the size of the protests 
and the scale of impact are still not taken into account. This fails to distinguish, for example, a 
mass demonstration in Gwanghwamun from a small street rally. 
Gillion (2012) examines empirical data from the US Congress to hypothesize how 
minority activism affects congressional roll-call votes supporting the minorities. The 
congressional responses are divided into two, aggregate and individual actions, and the research 
focuses on the latter to assess the district level responsiveness more accurately. Then the protests 
are also divided into two: small and large. “Smaller protests that lack institutional support and 
are short-lived struggle to become recognized and have their political preferences considered. 
But large, contentious protests that are backed by a political organization” (Gillion 2012). 
Politicians pay attention to such voices in order to maintain accountability, closely monitoring 
not only the protests but also the opposition. This determines which side takes the “issue 
ownership” leading to a more specified version of the hypothesis: a pro-minority protest has to 
outweigh its minority in scale in order to take issue ownership. In addition to the similar New 
York Times coverage counts, this study comes up with its own measures to assess the salience of 
protests. Protest activity that involves more than 100 individuals; lasts more than a day; is 
supported by a political organization; results in property damage; draws a police presence; leads 
to an arrest; involves individuals carrying weapons; leads to injury; or involves death. These 
binary points are used to calculate the salience score to discern which protest is informative 
enough to dominate the opponents. Gillion provides a very straightforward and comprehensive 
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insight about how to assess both the scope of activism and the congressional response which can 
be useful relevant to this research. 
Lastly, Youth Speak Out Coalition and Zimmerman (2007) divide youth organizations 
into different degrees of youth participation. Since some media reports were insufficient to 
discern all six categories, this study simplifies the spectrum and translates it into numerical 
scores of one, two, and three. 
• Youth as Clients: served by adults, no input into decision-making 1 
• Youth Participation: youth input solicited by adults   1 
• Youth Involvement: regular input      2 
• Youth Driven: substantive youth leadership    2 
 • Youth Run: majority of operation      3 
 • Youth Led: all youth leadership, adult support    3 
Although this literature deals with a broader sense of youth organizations, not necessarily of 
activist character, this spectrum is relevant to this research in defining and measuring youth 
involvement. It is also useful in determining what degree of youth involvement is enough to 
inform the politicians in the legislature. 
The following data counts all media-covered social movements with evidence of youth 
involvement between June 2012 and December 2019 every month, based on a binary basis, 
Gillion score, and Youth Speak Out Coalition and Zimmerman score. Different sets of keywords 
like youth protest, youth rally, middle and high school student protest, youth involvement, and 
youth organizations were searched on Naver, one of the nation’s most used portal websites. 
Among around 10,000 search results, about 600 turned out as relevant cases of youth 
involvement. A social movement is two or more people jointly advocating ongoing social 
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agenda. This definition is used to discern what is a social movement and what is not while 
searching for media coverages. For instance, a religious event is not a social movement because 
it usually does not, or should not, contain a social agenda. Likewise, a hate event does not count 
as a social movement because hate speech is not a legitimate social agenda. Attending memorial 
events is not a social movement because the agenda is not ongoing, but they count as social 
movements if they make a linkage to an ongoing social agenda like holding the government 
accountable or calling for further political actions.1 Also, unaffiliated one-person protests do not 
count in accordance with the South Korean legal definition of a protest, but if there is an 
organized background for “relay protests” or “contemporaneous protests,” they count although 
they might seem like a one-person protest. Lastly, the youth involvement has to be genuinely 
spontaneous. Therefore, extracurricular activities encouraged by schools as a form of 
volunteering do not count as genuine youth involvement in social movements. These are to count 
the genuine youth involvement in social movements more accurately without exaggeration. 
 First, the number and scale of youth-led organizations and events enable the evaluation of 
the overall political mobilization of youths, and their willingness to participate in politics. 
Second, the degree of youth involvement indicates their position in those social movements. To 
elaborate, a rally that mainly consists of protesters in their forties where some bring their 
children, is significantly different from a climate strike in a local community led by high school 
students. This enables a more accurate picture of what is the youths’ place in such movements. In 
order to be impactful, a considerable portion of the youth population should take initiative to 
mobilize themselves, and they should participate as significant members with actual say. This 




Figure 2. Media Reports on Youth Involvement over Time 
 Figure 2 examines the number of media reports on youth involvement each month from 
June 2012 to December 2019. While incidences of media-reported social movements with 
evidence of youth involvement over time show an upward trend, the actual fluctuation somewhat 
differed from the initial speculation. Youth-involved social movements did not steadily grow and 
peaked right before the 2019 passage, but rather fluctuated every time there was a salient agenda, 
namely the National Intelligence Service’s presidential election intervention allegations (2013), 
Sewol Ferry Accident (2014), the state Korean history textbook controversy (2015), and 
Choigate (2016). However, the waves, especially the last wave that was unprecedentedly tall, left 
a long-lasting legacy as they accumulated. That is turning involvement in social movements into 
a common experience. 
First, the agenda became much more diverse. At the beginning of the decade, youth 
involvement in social movements was largely restricted to only a few agendas such as 
diplomacy. However, as youths were familiarized with social movements through those major 
events, they started to turn to different agendas like youth rights, education, labor, feminism, 
Cho 30 
climate, and immigration. Their agenda was not necessarily partisan, because youth involvement 
took place around not only agendas typically associated with the Democratic Party but also its 
opponents. Broader agenda means more social movements they can engage in, naturally 
increasing the media coverages, as well as the number of people appealed by their input. 
 Second, youth involvement expanded to different localities. Youth involvement in its 
initial state was limited to the capital area, mostly the heart of Seoul consisting of government 
complexes and business districts. However, as youths that participated in big waves of social 
movements return to their homes, they brought the social movement experience culture with 
them. Not only in major cities but also in rural villages, socially active youths started to seek 
local events or even mobilize their peers. Localization of youth involvement also contributed to 
the increase of the overall count at the national level. 
 Lastly, youth involvement had become consistent compared to the early stage. The 
monthly incidences almost doubled at the end of the decade and the normal incidences tripled or 
even quadrupled, excluding the points where youth involvement hit its peaks. Even when there 
are no big events like impeachment, youths started to find issues that are relevant to their lives 
like school sexual harassment or regional student rights ordinances. This formed a seamless 
continuum that contrasts with the sporadic “seasons” shown at the beginning of the decade, also 
increasing the case count. 
 In sum, over the last decade, youth involvement in social movements had become more 
diverse, local, and consistent, normalizing the experience. The earlier waves were fluctuant, but 
the later ones rather stabilized into plateaus. The 2016 movements around the impeachment 
played a significant role as a turning point, providing momentum to this shift. This shift implies 
that youth involvement is no longer a peculiar phenomenon among a minority of socially active 
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ones but is now recognized as a common experience shared among the entire generation. While 
the former can be easily disregarded, the latter newly framed youths as political citizens, 
weighing the voting age agenda and raising the stakes of the legislative activities around 
lowering the voting age. 
 
Figure 3. Gillion Scores of Youth Involvement over Time 
 Figure 3 examines the monthly sums of Gillion scores of youth-involved movements in 
the same period, which serve as the scale of youth involvement over time. The second part of the 
across-time study addresses the scale of youth-involved protests over time based on the Gillion 
score, which shows relatively steady growth. The previous data demonstrate that youth 
involvement had become a much more widespread phenomenon. But this shows it is not only the 
occurrence that had grown but also the scale of each occurrence. This means that youth-led 
movements are not only happening more often but also bigger. If the Gillion score did not 
demonstrate a correlation that is as significant as that of the general case count, it could mean 




Figure 4. Youth Speak Out Coalition and Zimmerman Scores of Youth Involvement over Time 
 Figure 4 examines the monthly sums of Youth Speak Out Coalition and Zimmerman 
scores of youth-involved movements in the same period, which serve as the degree of youth 
input over time. This is the most notable growth among the three data. At first, youth 
involvement was largely youths joining the adult-led events as guests. In other words, the 
majority including the leadership was adults, and youths rather sporadically participated as not-
so-much visible participants of such events, such as weekly rallies calling for the resolution of 
the “comfort women” issue. However, once youth involvement had become a much more 
common experience, youths started to organize themselves based on schools and regional 
networks. More youth involvements in the latter portion of the decade are youth-led, where the 
majority including the leadership was youths, or the affiliated organization was even exclusively 
youths. For example, students organized to combat school sexual harassment and urge municipal 
legislatures to enact student rights ordinances. This suggests that youths had moved away from 
the dependent model and claimed dominance of their own movements. 
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 In sum, the media coverages, Gillion scores, and Youth Speak Out Coalition and 
Zimmerman scores display the upward trend in youth involvement in social movements in South 
Korea between 2012 and 2019. This upward trend of youth involvements had been consistent in 
both the quality and quantity. Going back to the 20 bills, the November 14, 2016 bill passed the 
subcommittee on January 9, 2017, and the April 24, 2019 bill passed the committee on August 
29, 2019, and the Plenary Session on December 27, 2019, and the rest failed. The first period 
was when the youth involvement was skyrocketing amid the impeachment process, and the 
second period was when it was stably growing. The correlation between youth involvement, both 
in quality and quantity, and the steps toward the final passage suggests the legislative response to 
the youth involvement. 
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V. Across-politician Study 
 However, the above results need to be complemented by more statistical certainty than 
simple legislative steps: the spatial variation among politicians representing different districts. As 
mentioned above, about five-sixth of the National Assembly is district seats. Each constituency 
represents around 100,000 to 200,000 voters, but the generational composition rather varies. The 
census data was collected from the official government websites of the National Election 
Commission, the Korean Statistical Information Service, and the Ministry of Interior and Safety. 
Constituencies with the most youth population, between 14 and 18, are residential areas of Seoul 
and its outskirts, while the least are rural counties. Youth involvement in each constituency also 
differed from one another. These variations also related to how individual district lawmaker 
responds to the voting age agenda. There were strong and moderate proponents, the indifferent, 
and opponents of the bills lowering the voting age. Their response is measured by counting each 
time they act in accordance with their views: introducing the bill, voting for or against the bill at 
committees and the Plenary Session, formally advocating or opposing the bill on the National 
Assembly floor or informally off the floor all of which significantly varied. 
Lawmaker support adds up a lawmaker’s roll call votes on bills lowering the voting age, 
both in committee and Plenary Session levels, introduction or sponsor of voting age bills, formal 
politics speech for or against lowering the voting age during National Assembly sessions, and 
informal politics speech outside the National Assembly. For example, Chang Byoung-wan (P-
Dong Nam 1) voted in favor of the voting age bill once, introduced two voting age bills, and 
informally supported lowering the voting age four times, adding up to the numerical score of 
seven. Conversely, another lawmaker could earn a negative score if they are an opponent. 
Positive numbers, zero, and negative numbers indicate advocacy, indifference, and opposition, 
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respectively. This meticulous counting method enables a more accurate assessment of a 
lawmaker’s informal support for lowering the voting age. 
Measuring the informal politics portion required thoughtful decisions of whether a 
media-reported act or speech counts as independent support. This data only includes reports with 
individual lawmaker’s own words, not a general party platform or bill summary. This should 
include a normative statement, not a simple reiteration of their party’s stance like “our party has 
reached a consensus” or “I promise that we would do everything to pass the bill this time.” Each 
informal support is counted based on contexts. If there are two media coverages, one on a party 
convention on lowering the voting age and the other on a participant’s tweet supporting it, these 
should count as one context. 
 
Figure 5. Youth Population and Lawmaker Support 
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Figure 6. Youth-to-Voter Ratio and Lawmaker Support 
Figures 5 and 6 respectively examine the youth population and youth-to-voter ratio of 
each district corresponding to the lawmaker’s support for the bill lowering the voting age. As 
shown from the figures, the youth population and youth-to-voter ratio vary greatly throughout 
districts. Either way, they depict how lawmakers were consistently conscious of the presence of 
their potential voters with growing political significance. This suggests that lawmakers are likely 
to take the voting age issue more seriously if their constituencies had more youths, the forecasted 
influx of new voters raising the stakes. 
 
Figure 7. Youth Involvement and Lawmaker Support 
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 Lastly, Figure 7 compares the youth involvement in each constituency with the 
lawmaker’s response. The location a social movement took place and its youth organization base 
are counted on a binary basis. This should acknowledge that due to the geographical features of 
South Korea, many protests are concentrated in one particular constituency, Jongno, one of two 
districts that make up the heart of Seoul. Although this is an executive and financial center with 
not much youth population, people visit here to participate in plenty of events, and youths are not 
the exception. As shown in the appendix, youth organizations based in regions other than Jongno 
travel in order to hold rallies at this bustling city center and reach more audiences. A Democrat 
from Jongno, then-Speaker Chung Sye-kyun, earned a fairly high support score, five.1 More 
generally, youth involvement in each constituency and the legislative response show a somewhat 
consistent link. Put together, lawmakers’ support for the voting age bills is contingent upon their 
constituencies’ youth population, ratio, and involvement in social movements, which have to do 
with the political influence of their potential constituents. Compared to when youth involvement 
was limited to a small number of politically active youths, lawmakers had become more and 
more aware of youths. Their support for the voting age bill reflects their effort to demonstrate 
this. 
Such a tendency is also backed by the lawmakers’ own words, as many recognize that 
they had been influenced by the youth’s demonstration of democratic capacity through their 
involvement in social movements. First, they exert their views on youth involvement in their 
formal and informal political activities. Park Nam-choon (D-Namdong 1) spoke at a committee: 
“the questions raised by the youths [at protests], by looking at their speech and act, they are even 
better than me.” Similarly, Sim Sang-jung (J-Goyang 1) testified “youths have enough proven 
their civic capacity at the vigil.” These remarks exemplify how lawmakers were perceiving the 
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increasing youth involvement in relation to the ongoing voting age agenda. “This bill is about 
suffrage. This is not something you oppose because of your political interests, as if it is a change 
to a random election rule” (Lee Jae-jeong). Their reaction also demonstrates the shift in the “is-
ought” problem: rather than that lowering the voting age “is” beneficial to their political interests 
but what is “ought” to be done. Youth involvement that has grown enough to signal the 
lawmakers increases the moral stakes of the agenda in turn. 
Second, the qualitative findings of the in-depth written interview enriched the theory 
alongside the empirical vindication. Sim Sang-jung recognizes that youths “possess a potential to 
organize independently from the older generation or teachers” and a similar public consensus 
had been reached due to the increase in youth involvement starting from the 2016-2017 
movement. As the committee Chair who was responsible for the actual passage, she concludes 
that youth involvement decisively impacted the 2019 passage. Sim’s response was also 
consistent with the is-ought problem suggested above: “disenfranchising the 18-year-olds not 
only infringes on their political rights but also undermines the advancement of our democracy 
[…] We think that the expansion of rights to vote and run for offices are the basic conditions of 
democratic advancement.” In sum, the legislative experience directly echoes the theory: the 
National Assembly was informed about the increasing youth involvement and the public support 
for the voting age bill. Given the higher stakes, lawmakers prioritize the agenda as something 
that is ought to be done, which is crucial to the final passage.  
Cho 39 
VI. Discussion 
 One major alternative explanation is that lowering the voting age is a typical Democratic 
project because young people tend to vote more liberal. Under this conventional wisdom, it is 
understood that the Democratic leadership will push this change and have their lawmakers vote 
for lowering the voting age. In other words, lawmakers do whatever they are told by the party 
leadership, and that is the case for the 20th National Assembly since 2017 where the Democratic 
Party took the presidency. The literature on this side argues that partisan leadership dominates 
legislators’ individual choice (Longley 1998). Given this condition, the constituent interest is 
represented by the parties rather than individual lawmakers, undermining the voter-lawmaker 
response. 
However, as explained above, Bishin (2004) challenges this view and claims a more 
multi-faceted aspect of the constituent-legislator relationship, where constituent ideology 
influences legislative behavior as well as partisan stance. Although adult and youth 
constituencies are not identical, it is more likely that legislators closely pay attention to youth 
interests in representing them. As shown from the interview response, National Assembly 
lawmakers were conscious about the influx of new voters who were unprecedentedly politically 
active. Youth involvement was the clear sign of their interest in politics, and lawmakers 
perceived their greater potential impact, in a fairly bipartisan manner. 
 Another is that lowering the voting age is already a quite universal trend, and South 
Korea was following the rest of the OECD liberal democracies just as time passes. This has to do 
with democratic diffusion theory, where external factors like supranational organizations play a 
role in adopting expanded democratic measures. International norms diffuse across the border 
and help implement more political rights. “Domestic political processes are deeply affected by 
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what goes on in neighboring societies, even if the specific ways in which external events 
influence transitions vary from context to context” (Gleditsch and Ward 2006). The literature 
explain this diffusion that voters pay attention to international standards introduced by media, 
and the reelection-driven politicians emulate those preceding democratic measures. The news 
that an internationally renowned state implemented a democratic measure, can increase voter 
support, and signal the politicians (Linos 2011). If lowering the voting age is considered as an 
enfranchisement of youths, such context can apply to the issue of lowering the voting age. In 
fact, as Japan lowered its voting age from 20 to 18 in June 2016, South Korea became the only 
OECD member with a voting age higher than 18. In South Korea, OECD is an organization both 
the legislature and media like to use as a comparative example. As discussed above, this fact had 
been invoked by multiple executive government agencies to endorse lowering the voting age to 
18. 
However, the democratic diffusion theory does not fully explain the South Korean case. 
The “international norm” claim had been used by many proponents of lowering the voting age 
since long ago in the early 2010s when Japan and South Korea were the only OECD members 
with voting ages higher than 18. However, it did not significantly motivate the lawmakers to 
prioritize the task. Even after 2016 when Japan lowered its voting age to 18 and South Korea 
became the only member, there had been 12 unsuccessful bills, more than half of the total. This 
even stronger narrative, that South Korea is “lagging behind,” also failed to bring about a 
significant shift to the National Assembly. This theory fails to explain this significant 
incoherence. 
 It should be acknowledged that youth involvement might not have been the only cause 
that led to the final passage in 2019. While the increasing youth involvement succeeded in 
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motivating the pan-liberal parties and lawmakers and some moderate conservatives, the passage 
might have been much harder if the ideological spectrum of the National Assembly was further 
on the extreme right. However, what is imperative is that youth involvement actually helped 
overcome, at least in part, the initial partisan division around voting age and generated a result 
that would have been impossible otherwise. In other words, youth involvement in social 
movements, both in protests and organizations, made a more comprehensive weapon to break 
through the gridlock and played a decisive role in passing the bill eventually. In sum, the partisan 
dynamics fails to explain the several unsuccessful bills after the inauguration of the Democratic 
administration, and the democratic diffusion theory is also chronologically irrelevant. Although 
it might not be the only factor that contributed to the passage, youth involvement is by far the 





 As with any historical case of enfranchisement, lowering the voting age is a complicated 
political process that concerns the will of not only those who can vote but also those who cannot. 
Although it superficially seems like a partisan project to introduce more liberal voters, it is in 
fact largely impacted by youth involvement in social movements. Once youth involvement gets 
big enough to be a common experience among the domestic youth group, youths are more 
regarded as politically capable citizens. This raises the stakes of the recurring legislative 
discussion of lowering the voting age, and lawmakers start to perceive this as their moral 
obligation (dangwi) rather than an ordinary partisan issue. Parties reach bipartisan consensus as 
they become aware of their party image which increasingly depends on their cooperation with 
the voting age bill. Individual lawmakers also respond to the youth population and involvement 
in their constituencies. There are other potential factors that are thought to have impacted the 
recent passage of the bill lowering the voting age from 19 to 18 in South Korea, such as a party 
in leadership or consciousness of peer liberal democracies. However, both the across-time and 
across-politician studies indicate that youth involvement in social movement better explains the 
end of the decade-long gridlock. 
 Although this study focuses on South Korea, the findings potentially have international 
implications. European liberal democracies have started discussing lowering the voting age to 
16, as well as some American politicians, all of which seem to be contingent upon the consistent 
trend in youths in liberal democracies that are more politically active than ever. Youths’ political 
capacity has long been overlooked in both political and academic settings. Youth involvement in 
social movement has been considered endogenous to social conditions at most, but this study 
shows that it can be an exogenous factor in itself. In other words, youth involvement is not an 
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outcome of a change induced by adults, but a spontaneous phenomenon that can lead to 
significant political changes affecting the entire public and youths themselves. Existing political 
science literature tend to explain youth politics with the language of the dominant. However, the 
power dynamics between political parties and diplomatic influences seem to provide superficial 
answers to the politics of lowering the voting age, which, in fact, is a multifaceted process 
involving different factors, even those who cannot vote, yet. Who lowers the voting age is the 
youth, not the politicians. 
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Appendix A: Raw Data 
Across-time Study
Coverage Event Scale Duration Gillion YSOCZ Y. Org. Affiliation Size
2012 June 10 Jongno 2 0 1
16 Jongno 20 50 1 3
July 25 Jongno 1 1 1
31 Jongno 10 1 1 3 Nationwide 70
August 1 Jongno 1 1 1
6 Jongno 12 1 0 3
6 1 Nationwide 80
29 Jongno 1 1 3
September 12 Jongno 10 1 0 1 Danyang
October 29 Jongno 1 1 2
November 16 Jongno 5 20 0 2 Nationwide 10000
20 Haeundae Gijang 1 3 1 0 3 Nationwide
December 19 Nationwide 100 1 1 3 Nationwide
2013 January 14 Cheonan 1 80 1 0 2 Nationwide 10000
14 Yeonsu 25 1 0 1
February 28 Jongno 150 1 1 1 Nationwide
March 8 Jung, Seoul 20 1 0 3 Nationwide
22 Jongno 6 1 0 3 Nationwide 350
April 28 Jongno 100 3 1 1 Nationwide
May 1 Jongno 1 1 1
19 Jongno 10 1 0 3 Gongju
June 17 Jeonju 20 1 0 1 Jeonbuk 40
24 Jongno 500 1 4 1
29 Jongno 70 3 1 3 Nationwide
July 6 Jung, Seoul 5000 1 3 1
10 Jongno 50 1 1 1
13 Jung, Seoul 10000 1 3 1
17 Jung, Seoul 60 1 0 3 Nationwide 817
19 Seongsan 100 1 1 1 Changwon
20 Jongno 400 1 3 1
26 Jongno 100 1 1 3 Nationwide 817
27 Jung, Seoul 10000 1 3 1
28 Seocho 10 1 1 3 Nationwide
29 Seogwipo 700 6 2 1 Seogwipo
29 Dong, Gwangju 120 1 0 3 Gwangju
31 Jongno 70 1 1 1
August 1 Jung, Seoul 11 1 0 2
14 Hwacheon 60 1 0 2
15 Namdong 1 10 1 0 3 Incheon
16 Jongno 1000 1 2 1
17 Jung, Seoul 20000 1 3 1
20 Jung, Seoul 30000 5 3 1
21 Songpa 3 7 1 1 3
24 Jeju 2 150 1 1 1
30 Seongsan 200 1 2 1
September 7 Jongno 10000 1 2 1
14 Jongno 24 1 1 3
16 Yeongdeungpo 2 1 1 1
19 Jongno 500 1 1 1
26 Jongno 20 1 1 3
28 Jongno 3000 1 2 1
October 3 Miryang 150 4 3 1
7 Jongno 200 1 1 1
11 Jung, Seoul 400 1 2 1
November 7 Jung, Seoul 12 1 0 3
13 Jongno 200 1 2 1
December 19 Jung, Seoul 10000 1 2 1
25 Jongno 300 1 1 1
28 Jongno 200 1 2 1
29 Jongno 15000 1 5 1
29 Gangnam 2 100 1 1 3
2014 January 1 Jongno 100 1 2 1
8 Jongno 200 1 3 1
11 Jongno 20 1 0 3
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29 Jongno 100 1 3 1
February 22 Jongno 10 1 2 2
26 Jongno 300 1 1 1
March 1 Jongno 200 1 1 1
April 22 Chuncheon 60 1 0 2
23 Cheonan 2 30 1 0 1
26 Jongno 100 1 1 2
29 Jongno 20 1 0 1
May 1 Jongno 30 1 0 1
3 Jongno 300 1 1 3
9 Danwon 2 2000 1 1 3
10 Jung, Seoul 4000 1 2 1
10 Danwon 2 500 1 2 3
18 Jongno 600 1 2 1
24 Jongno 20 9 1 3
24 Jung, Seoul 20000 1 2 1
24 Dong, Gwangju 300 1 1 3
25 Nam 2, Incheon 100 1 1 3
28 Jongno 1 2 1
June 1 Jung, Seoul 10000 1 2 1
4 Jongno 4 1 0 3
4 Jongno 800 1 2 1
11 Jongno 300 1 3 1
16 1
18 Jongno 300 1 2 1
July 16 Yeongdeungpo 2 600 2 3 2
19 Jung, Seoul 10000 1 3 1
20 Jongno 8 8 1 3
23 Jongno 1 2 1
25 Jung, Daejeon 700 1 1 1
August 13 Jongno 700 1 1 3
26 Jongno 150 34 3 1
September 20 Jongno 11 1 1 3
October 30 Jeonju 70 1 0 1
November 1 Jongno 300 1 1 3
10 Haeundae Gijang 1 30 1 0 2 Yeonje 226
13 Jung, Seoul 10 1 0 3
December 3 Jongno 100 1 2 1
10 Jongno 100 1 2 1
17 Jongno 150 1 2 1
24 Jongno 400 1 2 2
31 Jongno 100 1 2 1
2015 January 7 Jongno 100 1 2 1
21 Jongno 100 1 2 1
February 22 Jongno 150 1 2 1
March 25 Jongno 100 1 2 1
April 11 Nam 1, Ulsan 200 1 1 1
12 Sokcho 150 1 1 2
14 Jongno 30 1 1 1
16 Uijeongbu 1 250 1 1 1
16 Jinju 2 150 1 1 1
18 Jung, Seoul 8000 1 3 1
19 Dong, Gwangju 200 1 1 1
23 Jongno 20 1 0 1
May 6 Jongno 100 1 2 1
June 3 Jongno 100 1 2 1
July 7 Sasang 10 1 0 2
29 Jongno 700 1 2 1
30 Wonju 20 1 0 3
31 Jongno 150 1 2 2
August 12 Jung, Seoul 500 1 2 1
19 Jongno 300 1 2 1
24 Seo 1, Gwangju 150 1 1 1
September 2 Jongno 150 1 2 1
14 Uijeongbu 1 10 1 0 3
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October 7 Yeonje 300 1 1 1
11 Jongno 100 1 1 3
14 Jongno 500 1 3 1
17 Jongno 1000 3 2 2 Nationwide 950
20 Yeongdo 104 1 1 2
20 Jongno 20 1 0 3 Gwanak
22 Jongno 1000 1 1 2
24 Jongno 150 2 3 3 Nationwide 2800
31 Jongno 300 1 2 3 Nationwide
November 1 Seodaemun 2 30 1 0 1
1 Cheonan 1 20 1 0 3 Chungnam
3 Jongno 300 1 1 1
4 Incheon 1104
7 Jongno 100 1 2 3
11 Jongno 15 1 1 3
12 Jung, Seoul 10 1 0 2 Nationwide
14 Jongno 100000 1 5 1
15 Dong, Gwangju 70 1 0 3
22 Masanhoewon 20 1 0 3
December 5 Jongno 300 1 1 3
6 Dong, Gwangju 50 1 0 3 Gwangju
9 Jongno 100 1 2 1
12 Jongno 24 1 0 3 Nationwide 1370
19 Jongno 5000 1 2 1
26 Jongno 20 1 0 3
30 Jongno 700 1 2 1
2016 January 2 Jongno 30 1 0 3
6 Jeju 1 30 1 0 3
6 Suwon 2 100 1 1 2 Suwon
6 Masanhappo 20 1 1 2
6 Nam 1, Ulsan 200 1 1 1
10 Jung, Seoul 600 1 2 1
11 Jung, Seoul
11 Nationwide
13 Jongno 100 1 2 1
13 Jeju 2 50 1 0 1
16 Jung, Seoul 80 1 0 3 Nationwide
18 Gwangju, Gyeonggi 30 1 0 1
22 Uichang 100 1 1 1
February 10 Jongno 300 1 2 1
22 Jongno 100 1 2 1
27 Jongno 40 1 0 3
27 Seodaemun 2 10 1 0 3
March 1 Jung, Seoul 500 1 3 1
12 Tongyeong 50 1 0 3
April 16 Gwangju, Gyeonggi 200 1 1 1
16 Jongno 50 1 1 3 Nationwide
17 Dong, Gwangju 300 1 1 1
May 25 Gangnam 1 8 3 1
June 29 Dong, Busan 120 160 3 1
July 17 Yongsan 200 1 1 3
28 Jongno 100 1 1 1
August 14 Jongno 1000 1 3 1
18 Seo, Daejeon 100 1 1 1
September 28 Jeju 2 100 1 1 1
October 1 Jongno 15000 1 2 1
8 Jongno 70 1 1 3
8 Jongno 1 0 3
20 Jongno 1 0 1
27 Nationwide
27 Jongno 10 1 0 3
29 Jongno 20 1 0 3
29 Jung, Seoul 10000 1 3 1
29 Jeju 2 1000 1 2 1
November 1 Jongno 1000 2 4 1
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1 Gimje 10 1 0 3
3 Chuncheon 100 1 1 1
3 Sangdang 1000 1 1 1
4 Busanjin 2 1000 8 2 2
4 Sangdang 10 1 0 3 Chungbuk
4 Yesan 15 1 0 3
5 Jongno 400 1 2 2 Nationwide
5 Jongno 50 1 0 3
5 Jongno 100000 1 3 1
5 Dong, Busan 2000 1 2 1
6 Gwangyang 300 1 1 3
6 Yeongdeungpo 2 30 1 0 3 Nationwide 1600
6 Dong Nam 2 20 1 0 3
7 Jung, Daegu 1500 1 1 1
8 Seo 2, Daejeon 800 1 2 1
9 Suwon 3 20 1 0 3 Suwon
9 Wonju 1 200 1 1 3 Wonju
9 Namwon 200 1 1 3 Namwon
9 Jeju 2 1000 1 1 1
10 Jinju 2 10 1 0 3
11 Jung, Daegu 10 1 0 3
11 Gunsan 500 1 1 3 Gunsan
11 Jung, Daegu 4000 1 2 2 Daegu 602
11 Gimhae 2 150 1 1 1
12 Jongno 2000 1 1 3 Nationwide
12 Jeju 2 429 1 0 3 Jeju
12 Sangdang 400 1 1 1
12 Jongno 500000 1 1 2
12 Busanjin 2 5000 1 2 1
13 Yeonje 20 1 0 3 Busan 104
13 Jeonju 1 1500 1 3 1
13 Jongno 1 0 3 Incheon
16 Cheonan 1 400 1 1 3 Cheonan
16 Seongsan 300 1 1 3
16 Cheonan 1 3000 1 2 1
17 Jongno 150 1 1 3
18 Geochang 150 1 1 3 Geochang
19 Mapo 2 300 1 1 2
19 Jongno 200 1 1 2
19 Busanjin 2 60000 1 3 1
19 Dong Nam 2 50000 1 2 1
19 Gunpo 2 1000 1 2 1
19 Nam 2, Ulsan 5000 1 2 1
19 Jeonju 1 8000 1 3 1
19 Wonju 1 2000 1 1 1
19 Uichang 10000 1 1 1
19 Jeju 2 5000 1 1 1
19 Chuncheon 5000 1 1 1
19 Sangdang 10000 1 1 1
19 Jongno 500000 1 2 1
20 Gangneung 2000 1 1 1
23 Jeonju 1 300 1 1 3 Jeonju; Wanju
23 Dong Nam 2 1000 1 1 1
24 Masanhoewon 100 1 1 1
25 Dalseo 2 500 1 1 1
25 Seogwipo 500 1 1 1
26 Jongno 400 1 1 3
26 Dong Nam 2 100 1 1 3 Gwangju
26 Busanjin 2 300 1 1 3
26 Uichang 7000 1 2 1
26 Jung, Daegu 30000 1 2 1
26 Nam, Ulsan 5000 1 2 1
26 Jeju 2 1500 1 1 1
26 Chuncheon 700 1 2 1
26 Jongno 900000 1 2 1
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26 Busanjin 2 60000 1 2 1
27 Jongno 20 1 0 3
30 Wonju 2 200 1 1 3 Wonju
December 3 Yeongdeungpo 2 1700 1 2 1 Nationwide
3 Jongno 200 1 1 3 Nationwide
3 Namdong 1 60 1 0 3 Incheon
3 Jung, Daegu 20000 1 1 1
3 Dong Nam 2 1 0 3 Gwangju
3 Busanjin 2 50000 1 2 1
3 Seo 2, Daejeon 30000 1 3 1
3 Chuncheon 5000 1 1 1
3 Jongno 1000000 1 2 1
3 Sacheon 1 1 1
3 Jeonju 1 10000 1 1 1
4 Seo 2, Daejeon 600 1 1 2
10 Jongno 150 1 1 3 Nationwide
10 Jeju 4000 1 2 1
10 Sangdang 2000 1 2 1
10 Jongno 700000 1 2 1
10 Yeosu 400 1 1 1
10 Seo 2, Daejeon 5000 1 1 1
12 Jung, Seoul 1 0 3 Nationwide
16 Masanhappo 100 1 1 2
17 Jongno Nationwide 2000
17 Jeonju 1 2000 1 2 1
17 Busanjin 2 300 1 1 3
17 Jongno 300000 1 2 1
24 Dong Nam 2 1 0 3
24 Jongno 1000 1 1 3
24 Seo 2, Daejeon 1000 1 2 1
31 Jeonju 1 2000 1 3 1
2017 January 7 Buk, Pohang 1 0 1
7 Jung, Daegu 2000 1 1 1
8 Yeongdeungpo 2 20 1 0 3 Nationwide
8 Jeonju 1 200 1 1 2 Jeonbuk
8 Dong Nam 2 1000 1 1 3
9 Yeongdeungpo 2 10 1 0 3 Nationwide
10 Jongno 10 1 0 3
11 Jongno 200 1 2 1 Paju
12 Yeongdeungpo 2 10 1 2 3
14 Dong Nam 2 2000 1 1 1
14 Nam 2, Ulsan 300 1 2 1
18 Andong 25 1 0 3 Daegu; Gyeongbuk
18 Jongno 200 1 2 1
18 Uichang 20 1 0 3 Gyeongnam
18 Yeongdeungpo 2 500 1 2 2
18 Seo 2, Daejeon 20 1 0 3 Dangjin; Daejeon; Seosan; Sejong; Asan; Cheonan; Cheongyang; Cheongju; Chungju; Hongseong
18 Dong, Busan 20 1 0 3 Busan
19 Yeongdeungpo 2 500 1 2 2
21 Jongno 150000 1 1 1
21 Jeonju 1 2000 1 1 1
21 Jung, Daegu 1500 1 1 1
21 Seo 2, Daejeon 500 1 1 1
February 1 Yeongdeungpo 2 3 1 0 3
4 Jongno 15 1 0 3 Nationwide
4 Jeju 2 1 1 1
6 Jung, Daegu 700 1 1 1
8 Yeongdeungpo 2 100 1 2 2
11 Chuncheon 100 1 1 1
11 Jongno 300000 2 3 1
11 Dong Nam 2 1 0 3 Gwangju
12 Jeonju 1 500 1 1 1
15 Goseong 10 1 0 3 Goseong; Sacheon
16 Yuseong 2 200 1 1 1
18 Jongno 5 1 0 3 Nationwide
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18 Jeju 2 700 1 1 1
18 Dong Nam 2 5000 1 1 1
20 Jongno 1 2 1
21 Asan 1 20 1 0 2
22 Jongno 200 1 2 1
25 Jongno 100 1 1 3
25 Jeju 2 800 1 1 1
27 Jongno 500000 1 2 1
27 Hongseong 25 1 0 2
28 Yeongdeungpo 2 10 1 0 2
March 4 Jongno 400 1 1 2 Nationwide
4 Dong Nam 2 30000 1 1 1
6 Uichang 1000 1 1 1
10 Jongno 20000 1 2 1
11 Damyang 200 1 1 1
21 Jeju 1 50 1 0 2
22 Dong Nam 2 30 1 0 2
31 Yeonje 15 1 0 2
April 11 Yeonje 18 1 0 2 Busan; Gwangju; Daejeon; Chuncheon; Gumi; Icheon; Yeosu
15 Danwon 2 1000 1 1 2 Ansan
15 Dong Nam 2 500 1 1 1
15 Jongno 50000 1 2 1
16 Dangjin 200 1 1 1
16 Wonju 1 22 1 0 3 Wonju
16 Seosan 300 1 1 1
19 Gangbuk 1 10 1 0 3
27 Dong Nam 2 25 1 0 2 Gwangju
29 Jongno 30000 1 1 1
30 Jongno 1 2 1
May 1 Bupyeong 1 1800 1 2 1
9 Jongno 200 1 2 1
9 Nationwide Nationwide 18000
9 Jongno 100 1 1 3
17 Jongno 1 2 1
June 10 Jung, Seoul 10 1 0 3
19 Mapo 700 1 1 1
21 Seo 1, Gwangju 7 1 0 3
July 15 Jung, Seoul 50000 1 2 1
18 20 1 0 3 Bucheon
22 Jung, Seoul
28 Goyang
August 2 Jongno 1000 1 2 1
4 Suwon 5 80 11 1 2
9 Jongno 2500 1 2 2
9 Jeju 1 20 1 0 2
14 Seongsan Seongsan
15 Jongno 3 1 0 3
15 Jung, Seoul 5000 1 1 1
16 Jongno 1 2 1
21 Jongno
30 Jongno 100 1 2 1 Gwangju
September 6 Jongno 100 1 2 1
26 Yeongdeungpo 2 30 1 1 2
October 12 Jongno 100 1 2 1
18 Asan Nationwide
23 Busan
25 Jongno 1000 1 2 1
28 Jongno 20 1 0 3 Nationwide
28 Jongno 20000 1 1 1
29 Jinju 2 10 1 0 1
November 2 Jongno 25 1 1 3 Nationwide
2 Yeongdeungpo 2 15 1 1 3 Nationwide
2 Suwon 3 15 1 0 3 Gyeonggi
4 Seo 2, Daejeon 150 1 1 1
12 Gunsan
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22 Jongno 30 1 0 3
22 Yeongdeungpo 2 1 1 2
25 Busanjin 1 25 1 0 3 Busan
December 2 Jongno 15 1 0 2 Seocheon
2 Jongno 400 1 2 1
11 Uichang 10 1 0 3 Gyeongnam
14 Jongno 10 1 0 3 Nationwide
19 Boseong 50 1 0 3 Boseong
22 Yeongdeungpo 2 1 1 2
27 Jongno 400 1 2 1
28 Hoengseong 6 1 0 3
2018 January 2 Jongno 250 1 2 1
11 Yeongdeungpo 2 20 1 0 3 Nationwide
13 Jongno 12 1 0 3 Nationwide
13 Seongsan 40 3 1 3 Gyeongnam
26 Mapo 2 20 1 0 3
29 Guro 2 450 1 1 3
February 1 Yeongdeungpo 2 12 1 0 3 Nationwide 660
1 Gumi 1 30 1 0 3 Gumi 780
11 Seongsan 30 1 0 3 Gyeongnam
21 Jongno 1
22 Suyeong 12 1 0 2 Busan
25 Jongno 400 1 2 1
28 Jongno 100 1 2 1
March 1 Eunpyeong 2 50 10 1 2
1 Jeju 1 20 1 0 3 Jeju
1 Dong Nam 2 Gwangju
1 Jongno
4 Jongno 400 1 1 1
8 Yeongdeungpo 2 10 1 1 2
14 Jeju 2 6 1 0 2
21 Yeongdeungpo 2 50 1 0 3 Nationwide
22 Yeongdeungpo 2 50 43 3 3 Nationwide
21 Yeongdeungpo 2 50 1 0 3 Nationwide
April 7 Jung, Daegu 50 1 0 1
10 Yeongdeungpo 2 5 1 1 3 Nationwide
11 Yeongdeungpo 2 20 1 0 3 Nationwide
14 Yeongdeungpo 2 200 1 1 2
16 Haman
18 Gunsan 300 1 1 3 Gunsan
19 Gangbuk 1 15 1 0 3 Nationwide
24 Yeongdeungpo 2 20 2 1 3 Nationwide
30 Yeongdeungpo 2 5 1 0 3 Nationwide
May 2 Jongno
7 Jongno
10 Yeongdeungpo 2 20 1 1 2
25 Jongno 15 1 0 2 Nationwide
25 Gwangsan 1 8 1 0 3 Gwangsan
27 Yeongdeungpo 2 10 1 1 2
28 Dong Nam 2 4000 1 1 2 Gwangju
June 2 Seongsan 10 1 0 3
6 Jongno
6 Mapo
10 Dongnae 400 2 2 3 Dongnae
13 Jongno 500 1 2 1
13 Jongno 30 1 0 3
30 Jongno 50 1 1 1
July 7 Jongno 2500 1 2 1
18 Jongno 200 1 2 1
August 3 Jongno 3000 1 2 1
6 Dong Nam 2 20 1 0 1
8 Jongno 200 1 2 1
9 Jeju 2
15 Jongno 30 1 0 2
September 10 Dong, Incheon
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26 Jeju 1 20 1 0 2 Jeju
October 3 Jongno 500 1 2 1
3 Yeonsu 2 100 1 1 3
8 Jinju 2 20 1 1 3
13 Nationwide
13 Haeundae 1
November 2 Jongno 20 1 0 3 Nationwide 120
2 Geumcheon
3 Jongno 200 1 1 3
15 Jongno
18 Jung, Daegu 100 1 1 3
22 Uichang 10 1 0 2
28 Jeju 1 30 1 0 2 Jeju
December 1 Yeongdeungpo 2 12000 1 2 1
10 Jung, Seoul 1 2 1
10 Yeongdeungpo 2 8 1 0 2
27 Namdong 1 50 1 0 2
2019 January 3 Uichang 10 1 1 3 Gyeongnam 110
4 Jongno 10 1 0 3
11 Jongno Yangpyeong
22 Yeongdeungpo 2 100 1 2 2
29 Yeongdeungpo 2 70 1 0 3 Nationwide
February 1 Jongno 500 1 2 1
13 Jongno 100 1 2 1
14 Yeongdeungpo 2 12 1 0 3 Nationwide
15 Uichang 20 1 0 3 Gyeongnam
16 Jongno 150 1 1 3




9 Uichang 20 1 0 3 Gyeongnam
15 Uichang 10 1 0 3 Gyeongnam
15 Jongno 300 1 2 3
21 Uichang 30 1 0 3 Gyeongnam
27 Buan 15
29 Uichang
April 10 Jongno 100 1 2 1
15 Uichang 500 1 2 3
15 Dangjin 200 1 1 3
May 4 Jongno 100 1 1 2 Nationwide
13 Uichang 8 3 1 3 Gyeongnam 500
17 Gangnam 1 200 1 1 1
20 Gwanak 1 15 1 0 3 Gwanak 1
21 Yeongdeungpo 2 20 1 0 3 Nationwide
23 20 1 0 3 Jinju
23 Uichang 10 1 0 3 Gyeongnam
24 Jongno 200 1 1 3
25 Hwaseong 2 20 1 0 2 Hwaseong
June 1 Jung, Seoul 15000 1 2 1
6 Jeju 1 18 1 0 3
10 Gwacheon 6 1 0 3
19 Jongno
26 Jongno
July 4 Uichang 2000 1 2 1
14 Uichang 60 1 0 3 Gyeongnam
20 WonJu 1 30 1 0 2
21 Jongno 5000 1 1 1
23 Gapyeong 13 1 0 3 Gapyeong
23 15 1 0 3 Pyeongtaek





29 Jongno 5000 1 1 1
August 5 Hongcheon
5 Jongno
7 Jongno 300 1 2 1
8 Jongno 30 1 1 2
10 Jongno 30 1 1 3 Nationwide 1000
11 Dong Nam 2 1000 1 1 1
12 Jongno 15 1 0 3 Nationwide
14 Jongno 1500 1 3 1 Chuncheon
14 Cheonan 1 50 1 0 2 Cheonan; Asan
15 Jeju 1 20 1 0 3 Jeju
15 Sangdang 300 1 2 1
15 Jongno 100000 1 2 1
15 Yeosu 1 1500 1 1 1
24 Jongno 3000 1 1 1
25 Gangseo 2 15 1 0 3 Songpa
26 Yesan 150 1 1 3 Yesan
31 Bupyeong 1 1000 1 2 1
September 4 Jung, Seoul 50 1 0 1
21 Haeundae 1 200 1 1 1
21 Jongno 4000 1 1 3 Nationwide 2000
25 Jongno 10 1 1 1
26 Mapo 2 10 1 0 3
27 Jongno 300 1 1 3 Nationwide
28 Seocho 2 200000 1 2 1
October 3 Jongno 400000 1 2 1
4 Nationwide 15
12 Jung, Daegu
25 Gwanak 1 5 1 0 2
November 3 Jongno 30 1 0 3 Nationwide
23 Yeongdeungpo 2 1 1 1
29 Jongno 10 1 0 3
December 1 Yeongdeungpo 2 10 1 0 3 Nationwide 1234
1 Uichang
4 Jongno 200 1 2 1
7 Jongno 1500 1 1 1
8 Jongno
13 Jeju1 15 1 0 2
16 Gimpo 10
18 Jongno
20 Yeongdeungpo 2 8 1 0 2
23 Seongsan 30 1 0 3 Gyeongnam
26 30 1 1 2
27 Yeongdeungpo 2 5 1 1 3
31 Yeongdeungpo 2 20 1 0 3 Nationwide
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Across-politician Study
19th Youth Popul Voter Popul Youth:Voter Youth Invol Support
Chung Sye-kyun D Seoul Jongno 8534 134151 0.06361488 94 1
Chyung Ho-joon D→P Jung 5442 111048 0.04900584 23 0
Chin Young L→D Yongsan 11247 200267 0.05616003 0 0
Choi Jae-cheon D→I Seongdong 1 7549 133091 0.05672059 0 0
Hong Ihk-pyo D Seongdong 2 7117 115905 0.06140374 0 0
Kim Han-gil D→P Gwangjin 1 11144 152054 0.07328975 0 3
Choo Mi-ae D Gwangjin 2 9158 153045 0.05983861 0 0
Ahn Gyu-baek D Dongdaemun 1 8573 160735 0.05333624 0 0
Min Bynug-doo D Dongdaemun 2 9188 147428 0.06232195 0 0
Seo Young-kyo D Jungnang 1 9594 161289 0.05948329 0 1
Park Hong-keun D Jungnang 2 12623 192161 0.06568971 0 3
You Seung-hee D Seongbuk 1 12973 200390 0.06473876 0 0
Shin Gye-ryoon D Seongbuk 2 11760 186857 0.06293583 0 0
Oh Young-sik D Gangbuk 1 8306 140208 0.05924056 0 0
You Dae-won D Gangbuk 2 9394 143013 0.06568634 0 0
In Jae-keun D Dobong 1 10547 142308 0.07411389 0 0
Yoo Ihn-tae D Dobong 2 10659 151659 0.07028267 0 0
Lee No-keun L Nowon 1 9370 141348 0.06629029 0 -1
Woo Won-shik D Nowon 2 19750 167314 0.11804153 0 0
Roh Hoe-chan U→J Nowon 3
Ahn Cheol-soo I→D→P 12852 160153 0.08024826 0 0
Lee Mi-kyung D Eunpyeong 1 11069 170772 0.06481742 0 1
Lee Jae-oh L→I Eunpyeong 2 17212 241878 0.07115984 0 0
Woo Sang-ho D Seodaemun 1 7334 126944 0.05777351 0 0
Chung Doo-un L Seodaemun 2 9158 134819 0.06792811 2 0
Noh Woong-rae D Mapo 1 7318 131409 0.05568873 0 0
Jung Cheong-rae D Mapo 2 11670 190627 0.06121903 0 0
Kil Jeong-woo L Yangcheon 1 23727 201479 0.11776413 0 0
Kim Yong-tae L Yangcheon 2 13394 186895 0.07166591 0 0
Shin Ki-nam D Gangseo 1 17553 256901 0.06832593 0 0
Kim Sung-tae L Gangseo 2 13947 226281 0.06163575 0 0
Lee In-young D Guro 1 12414 196276 0.06324767 0 0
Park Young-sun D Guro 2 8389 156590 0.05357303 0 0
Rhee Mok-hee D Geumcheon 12377 202448 0.06113669 0 2
Kim Young-joo D Yeongdeungpo 1 8699 173896 0.05002415 0 0
Shin Kyoung-min D Yeongdeungpo 2 9159 149505 0.06126217 2 1
Jun Byung-hun D Dongjak 1 11716 178311 0.06570542 0 0
Chung Mong-joon L Dongjak 2 7630 165276 0.0461652 0 0
Na Kyung-won L 7630 165276 0.0461652 0 0
Yoo Ki-hong D Gwanak 1 11159 234236 0.04763999 1 0
Lee Sang-kyu U Gwanak 2 10902 209177 0.05211854 1 0
Oh Shin-whan L
Kim Hoe-sun L Seocho 1 14894 166015 0.08971478 0 0
Kang Seog-hoon L Seocho 2 13132 194657 0.06746225 1 0
Shim Yoon-joe L Gangnam 1 17987 250221 0.07188445 1 0
Kim Jong-hoon L Gangnam 2 22645 221573 0.10220108 1 0
Park In-sook L Songpa 1 12721 167969 0.07573421 0 1
Yoo Il-ho L Songpa 2 11904 164787 0.07223871 0 0
Kim Eul-dong L Songpa 3 16033 208289 0.07697478 1 0
Shin Dong-woo L Gangdong 1 16806 214183 0.07846561 0 0
Shim Jae-kwon D Gangdong 2 11321 178721 0.06334454 0 0
Chung Ui-hwa L Busan Jung Dong 6440 124170 0.05186438 0 0
Yoo Ki-Jnue L Seo 6185 102328 0.06044289 0 0
Lee Jae-kyun L Yeongdo
Kim Moo-sung L 6741 114201 0.0590275 0 -2
Na Seong-jin L Busanjin 1 10479 166971 0.0627594 0 0
Lee Hun-seong L Busanjin 2 9111 161896 0.05627687 0 0
Lee Jin-bok L Dongnae 17348 228810 0.07581836 0 0
Kim Jung-hoon L Nam 1 7759 121049 0.06409801 0 0
Seo Yong-gyo L Nam 2 8727 118085 0.07390439 0 0
Park Min-shik L Buk Gangseo 1 9037 131180 0.06889007 0 0
Kim Do-eup L Buk Gangseo 2 14818 185682 0.0798031 0 0
Suh Byung-soo L Haeundae Gijang 1 19459 248277 0.07837617 2 0
Bae Duk-kwang L 19459 248277 0.07837617 0 0
Ha Tae-keung L Haeundae Gijang 2 16620 207100 0.08025109 0 1
Moon Dae-sung L Saha 1 8676 124694 0.06957833 0 1
Cho Kyoung-tae D→L Saha 2 12143 158812 0.07646148 0 0
Kim Se-yeon L Geumjeong 14459 211253 0.068444 0 1
Kim Hee-jung L Yeonje 11677 173901 0.0671474 2 0
Yoo Jae-jung L Suyeong 9079 152617 0.05948879 0 0
Moon Jae-in D Sasang 13481 204200 0.06601861 1 2
Kim Hee-kuk L Daegu Jung Nam 11582 209205 0.05536197 0 0
Yoo Sung-kull L→I Dong 1 6253 111726 0.05596728 0 0
Yoo Seong-min L→I Dong 2 12198 176096 0.06926904 0 1
Kim Sang-hoon L Seo 11472 181101 0.06334587 0 0
Kwon Eun-hee L→I Buk 1 8459 121754 0.06947616 0 0
Suh Sang-kee L Buk 2 23299 229424 0.10155433 0 0
Lee Hahn-koo L Suseong 1 26169 201566 0.12982844 0 0
Joo Ho-young L→I Suseong 2 13013 155819 0.08351356 0 0
Hong Ji-man L Dalseo 1 15301 149218 0.10254125 0 0
Yoo Jae-ok L Dalseo 2 19196 191443 0.10027005 0 0
Cho Won-jin L Dalseo 3 10521 141826 0.07418245 0 0
Lee Jong-jin L Dalseong 11815 145887 0.08098734 0 0
Park Sang-eun L Incheon Jung Dong Ongjin 10448 169838 0.06151745 3 0
Hong Il-pyo L Nam 1 10282 167775 0.06128446 3 0
Yoon Sang-hyun L→I Nam 2 12498 171627 0.07282071 2 -1
Hwang Woo-yea L Yeonsu 23036 242422 0.09502438 2 0
Park Nam-choon D Namdong 1 19959 244854 0.08151388 3 0
Youn Kwan-suk D Namdong 2 12611 165564 0.07616994 2 1
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Moon Byeong-ho D→P Bupyeong 1 15253 234141 0.06514451 2 1
Hong Young-pyo D Bupyeong 2 19774 219494 0.09008902 2 1
Shin Hak-young D→P Gyeyang 1 11487 129587 0.08864315 2 0
Choi Won-sik D→P Gyeyang 2 12010 143639 0.08361239 2 2
Lee Hag-jae L Seo Ganghwa 1 23284 276464 0.08422073 2 0
Ahn Deok-su L Seo Ganghwa 2 13789 168117 0.08202026 2 0
Ahn Sang-soo L→I
Park Joo-sun I→D→P Gwangju Dong 5549 85607 0.06481947 8 0
Park Hae-ja D Seo 1 11025 118850 0.09276399 3 0
Oh Byung-yoon U Seo 2 14013 122918 0.11400283 2 0
Chun Jung-bae D→P
Chang Byoung-wan D→P Nam 16588 175347 0.09460099 2 0
Kang Gi-jung D Buk 1 9884 127837 0.07731721 2 1
Lim Nae-hyun D→P Buk 2 23581 227271 0.10375719 2 0
Kim Dong-cheol D→P Gwangsan 1 12629 128051 0.09862477 2 0
Lee Yong-sup D Gwangsan 2 20893 161180 0.12962526 2 1
Kwon Eun-hee D→P 20893 161180 0.12962526 2 0
Lee Jang-woo L Daejeon Dong 14082 200225 0.07033088 0 0
Kang Chang-hee L Jung 16811 211481 0.07949177 1 0
Park Byeong-seog D Seo 1 17514 195051 0.0897919 0 0
Park Beom-kye D Seo 2 19615 241412 0.08125114 0 1
Lee Sang-min D Yuseong 23789 246906 0.09634841 0 0
Park Seong-hyo L Dadeok 14677 160910 0.09121248 0 0
Jeong Yong-ki L 14677 160910 0.09121248 0 0
Jeong Kab-yoon L Ulsan Jung 16156 193256 0.08359896 0 0
Lee Chae-ik L Nam 1 15327 150491 0.10184662 2 0
Kim Gi-hyeon L Nam 2 10995 126955 0.08660549 0 0
Bak Maeng-woo L 10995 126955 0.08660549 0 0
Ahn Hyo-dae L Dong 11536 140296 0.08222615 0 0
Park Dae-dong L Buk 14607 141994 0.10287054 0 0
Kang Ghil-boo L→I Ulju 14638 168329 0.08696065 0 0
Lee Hae-chan D Sejong 8393 121130 0.06928919 0 1
Lee Chan-yeol D Gyeonggi Suwon 1 21983 237514 0.09255454 1 1
Shin Jang-yong D Suwon 2 19734 235641 0.08374604 2 0
Chung Mi-kyung L 19734 235641 0.08374604 1 0
Nam Kyung-pil L Suwon 3 14672 202687 0.07238747 1 0
Kim Yong-nam L 14672 202687 0.07238747 1 -1
Kim Jin-pyo D Suwon 4 25066 247141 0.10142388 1 0
Park Kwang-on D 25066 247141 0.10142388 0 0
Kim Tae-nyeon D Seongnam Sujeong 11598 188620 0.06148871 0 2
Kim Mi-hyul U Jungwon
Shin Sang-jin L 14380 209510 0.06863634 0 0
Rhee Chong-hoon L Bundang 1 17499 185798 0.09418293 0 0
Jhun Ha-jin L Bundang 2 18749 205862 0.09107557 0 0
Moon Hee-sang D Uijeongbu 1 11743 169473 0.06929127 2 0
Hong Moon-jong L Uijeongbu 2 17028 177203 0.09609318 0 0
Lee Jong-kul D Anyang Manan 14575 205131 0.07105216 0 0
Lee Seok-hyun D Dongan 1 11616 144694 0.08027976 0 0
Shim Jae-chul L Dongan 2 14460 134765 0.10729789 0 0
Kim Kyung-kyub D Bucheon Wonmi 1
Sul Hoon D Wonmi 2
Kim Sang-hee D Sosa 13114 185957 0.07052168 0 1
Won Hye-young D Ojeong 12908 151583 0.08515467 0 1
Baek Jae-hyun D Gwangmyeong 1 9458 129697 0.07292381 0 5
Lee Un-ju D Gwangmyeong 2 12524 146509 0.0854828 0 1
Won Yoo-chul L Pyeongtaek 1 13090 185790 0.07045589 0 -1
Lee Jae-young L Pyeongtaek 2 17359 204720 0.08479386 0 1
Yu Eui-dong L 17359 204720 0.08479386 0 1
Jung Sung-ho D Yangju Dongducheon 19140 236843 0.08081303 0 0
Jeon Hae-cheol D Ansan Sangnok 1 16850 168972 0.09972066 0 1
Kim Young-hwan D→P Sangnok 2 12464 132296 0.09421298 0 0
Kim Myung-yeon L Danwon 1 12843 143377 0.08957504 0 0
Boo Jwa-hyun D→P Danwon 2 11719 114344 0.10248898 2 1
Sim Sang-jung U→J Goyang Deogyang 1 14948 190469 0.07847996 0 3
Kim Tae-won L Deogyang 2 11974 149915 0.07987193 0 0
Yoo Eun-hae D Ilsandong 21170 226621 0.09341588 0 1
Kim Hyun-mee D Ilsanseo 24459 230226 0.10623909 0 0
Song Ho-chang D Uiwang Gwacheon 15564 182353 0.08535094 0 1
Yun Ho-jung D Guri 12884 149265 0.08631628 0 3
Choi Jae-sung D Namyangju 1 20122 229469 0.0876894 0 1
Park Ki-choon D→I Namyangju 2 21913 263957 0.08301731 0 0
An Min-suk D Osan 13095 156727 0.08355293 0 0
Ko Hee-sun L Hwaseong 1
Suh Chung-won L 14126 194756 0.07253178 0 0
Lee Won-wook D Hwaseong 2 20696 206889 0.10003432 0 1
Ham Jin-gyu L Siheung 1 13719 136861 0.10024039 0 0
Cho Jeong-sik D Siheung 2 16070 169772 0.09465636 0 2
Lee Hack-young D Gunpo 18680 227612 0.08206949 0 0
Lee Hyun-jae L Hanam 8505 121501 0.06999942 0 0
Yoon Hu-duk D Paju 1 14907 168820 0.08830115 0 3
Hwang Jun-ha L Paju 2 10892 151345 0.07196802 0 0
Lee Woo-hyun L Yongin 1 22407 250554 0.08942982 0 0
Kim Min-gi D Yongin 2 21321 249030 0.08561619 0 0
Han Sun-kyo L Yongin 3 22423 232177 0.09657718 0 0
Kim Hack-yong L Anseong 11155 144562 0.07716412 0 -1
Yoo Jeong-bok L Gimpo 20349 262922 0.07739558 0 0
Hong Chul-ho L 20349 262922 0.07739558 0 0
Roh Chul-rae L Gwangju 17203 237647 0.07238888 2 0
Cho 55 
Kim Young-woo L Pocheon Yeoncheon 12246 165700 0.07390465 0 0
Yoo Seung-woo L→I Icheon 13806 160191 0.08618462 0 0
Choung Byoung-gug L Yeoju Yangpyeong Gapyeong 14981 230278 0.06505615 0 1
Kim Jin-tae L Gangwon Chuncheon 18724 221560 0.08450984 1 0
Kim Ki-sun L Wonju 1 10712 131908 0.08120811 1 0
Lee Kang-hoo L Wonju 2 12279 127434 0.09635576 0 0
Kweon Seong-dong L Gangneung 13999 176917 0.0791275 0 0
Lee Yi-jae L Donghae Samcheok 10247 137216 0.07467788 0 0
Chung Moon-hun L Sokcho Goseong Yangyang 8444 116716 0.07234655 1 1
Hwang Yong-cheul L Hongcheon Hoengseong 6639 97780 0.06789732 0 1
Yeom Dong-yeol L Taebaek Yeongwol Pyeongchang Jeongseon 9082 145379 0.0624712 0 0
Han Ki-ho L Cheorwon Hwacheon Yanggu Inje 7426 107270 0.06922718 1 0
Chung Woo-taik L Chungbuk Cheongju Sangdang 12284 120714 0.10176119 0 0
Oh Jae-sae D Heungdeok 1 15888 165476 0.09601392 0 0
Noh Young-min D Heungdeok 2 15710 162274 0.09681157 0 0
Yoon Jin-sik L Chungju 13750 169957 0.08090282 0 0
Lee Jong-bae L 13750 169957 0.08090282 0 0
Song Kwang-ho L Jecheon Danyang 10341 138951 0.07442192 1 0
Byun Jae-il D Cheongwon 13546 184966 0.07323508 0 0
Park Duk-hyum L Boeun Okcheon Yeongdong 7110 117821 0.06034578 0 0
Kyung Dae-soo L Jeungpyeong Jincheon Goesan Eumseong 9194 192162 0.04784505 0 0
Yang Seoung-jo D Chungnam Cheonan 1 21028 237165 0.08866401 3 0
Park Wan-ju D Cheonan 2 21215 227279 0.09334342 2 0
Park Soo-hyun D Gongju 6723 95091 0.0707007 2 1
Kim Tae-heum L Boryeong Seocheon 8972 136575 0.06569284 1 0
Lee Myoung-su L Asan 17989 225202 0.0798794 1 0
Sung Woan-jong L Seosan Taean 13906 185840 0.07482781 1 0
Kim Je-sik L 13906 185840 0.07482781 1 0
Lee In-je L Nonsan Gyeryong Geumsan 14043 180426 0.07783246 1 0
Kim Geun-tae L Buyeo Cheongyang
Lee Wan-koo L 5645 89475 0.06309025 1 0
Hong Moon-pyo L Hongseong Yesan 9968 148133 0.06729088 1 0
Kim Dong-wan L Dangjin 8861 129975 0.06817465 1 0
Kim Yun-duk D Jeonbuk Jeonju Wansan 1 10541 122769 0.08586044 1 0
Lee Sang-jik D Wansan 2 18721 162343 0.11531757 2 0
Kim sung-ju D Deokjin 21799 224382 0.09715129 2 0
Kim Kwan-young D→P Gunsan 18256 221310 0.08249062 1 0
Lee Choon-suak D Iksan 1 8462 117865 0.071794 1 1
Jeon Jeong-hee D→P Iksan 2 12404 126190 0.09829622 1 0
Yoo Sung-yop D→P Jeongeup 7484 96680 0.07741001 1 1
Kang Dong-won U→J→D Namwon Sunchang 6937 96140 0.07215519 1 2
Choi Gyu-sung D Gimje Wanju 9474 149716 0.06327981 1 1
Park Min-soo D Jinan Muju Jangsu Imsil 4606 90516 0.05088603 1 0
Kim Choon-jin D Gochang Buan 6400 100483 0.06369237 1 0
Park Jie-won D→P Jeonnam Mokpo 17898 186149 0.09614878 0 0
Kim Sung-gon D Yeosu 1 7494 101517 0.07382015 0 1
Joo Seung-yong D→P Yeosu 2 12494 132258 0.09446688 0 1
Kim Sun-dong U Suncheon Gokseong 23551 243179 0.09684636 0 1
Lee Jung-hyun L 23551 243179 0.09684636 0 0
Bae Ki-woon D Naju Hwasun 8960 131643 0.06806287 0 4
Shin Jeung-hoon D 8960 131643 0.06806287 0 0
Woo Yoon-keun D Gwangyang Gurye 13745 140036 0.09815333 0 0
Lee Nak-yon D Damyang Hampyeong Yeonggwang Jangseong 9576 158010 0.06060376 0 0
Lee Kai-ho D 9576 158010 0.06060376 0 0
Kim Seung-nam D→P→D Goheung Boseong 5316 100986 0.05264096 0 1
Hwang Ju-hong D→P Jangheung Gangjin Yeongam 7804 118583 0.06581045 0 0
Kim Yung-rok D Haenam Wando Jindo 8430 137777 0.06118583 0 0
Lee Yoon-seok D→C Muan Sinan 7022 103689 0.06772174 0 1
Lee Byung-suk L Gyeongbuk Pohang Buk 18427 218318 0.0844044 0 0
Kim Hyung-tae L Nam Ulleung
Park Myung-jae L 16156 209728 0.07703311 0 0
Jung Soo-sung L Gyeongju 16061 216698 0.07411697 0 0
Lee Cheol-uoo L Gimcheon 8004 112512 0.07113908 0 0
Kim Gwang-lim L Andong 9554 139149 0.06866021 0 0
Sim Hag-bong L Gumi 1 18316 174960 0.10468679 0 0
Kim Tae-whan L→I Gumi 2 12409 147799 0.08395862 0 0
Chang Yoon-seok L Yeongju 6759 92077 0.07340595 0 -2
Chung Hee-soo L Yeongcheon 4942 86583 0.05707818 0 0
Kim Jong-tae L Sangju 5553 87713 0.06330875 0 0
Lee Han-sung L Mungyeong Yecheon 5980 103680 0.05767747 0 0
Choi Kyoung-hwan L Gyeongsan Cheongdo 16721 245864 0.06800914 0 0
Yi Wan-young L Goryeong Seongju Chilgok 10883 166480 0.06537122 0 0
Kim Jae-won L Gunwi Uiseong Cheongsong 3764 95690 0.03933535 0 0
Kang Seok-ho L Yeongyang Yeongdeok Bonghwa Uljin 6721 124401 0.0540269 0 0
Park Seong-ho L Gyeongnam Changwon Uichang 18622 207547 0.08972426 2 0
Kang Gi-yun L Seongsan 19882 184814 0.10757843 3 0
Lee Ju-young L Masanhappo 10328 152372 0.06778148 2 0
Ahn Hong-joon L Masanhoewon 13848 173603 0.07976821 2 0
Kim Sung-chan L Jinhae 10914 140015 0.07794879 1 0
Park Dae-chul L Jinju 1
Kim Jae-kyung L Jinju 2
Lee Koon-kyon L Tongyeong Goseong 10969 159501 0.06877073 1 0
Yeo Sang-kyoo L Sacheon Namhae Hadong 11500 177831 0.06466814 0 0
Min Hong-chul D Gimhae 1 16633 170287 0.09767628 0 2
Kim Tae-ho L Gimhae 2 23540 231584 0.10164778 0 -1
Cho Hae-jin L Miryang Changnyeong 9078 146559 0.06194092 1 0
Cho 56 
Kim Han-pyo L Geoje 16820 188467 0.08924639 0 0
Yoon Young-seok L Yangsan 18935 229347 0.08256049 0 0
Cho Hyun-yong L Uiryeong Haman Hapcheon 7450 126484 0.05890073 0 0
Shin Sung-bum L Sancheong Hamyang Geochang 7785 118241 0.06584011 0 0
Kang Chang-il D Jeju Jeju 1 16986 184236 0.09219696 0 1
Kim Woo-nam D Jeju 2 15371 162557 0.0945576 2 0
Kim Jae-yun D Seogwipo 10104 128416 0.07868178 3 1
Min Byung-joo L Proportional Rep. 3257771 41455574 0.07858463 24 0
Kim Jung-rok L 0
Yoon Myung-hee L 0
Cho Myung-chul L 0
Kang Eun-hee L 1
Joo Young-soon L 0
Shin Yee-jin L 0
Lee Sang-il L 0
Lee Ailesa L 0
Lee Man-woo L 0
Park Geun-hye L 0
An Chong-bum L 0
Kim Hyun-sook L 0
Kim Jang-shil L 0
Lee Jasmine L 1
Choi Bong-hong L 0
Yoo Jee-young L 0
Song Young-keun L 0
Min Hyun-joo L 1
Park Chang-sik L 0
Shon In-chun L 0
Kim Sang-min L 0
Hyun Young-hee L 0
Lee Jae-young L 0
Shin Kyung-rim L 0
Lee Un-ryong L 0
Park Yoon-ok L 0
Yang Chang-young L 0
Jang Jung-eun L 0
Jung Youn-suk L 0
Moon Jeong-lim L 0
Kim Young-joo L 0
Hwang In-ja L 0
Chun Soon-ok D 1
Choi Dong-ic D 1
Eun Soo-mi D 0
Hong Jong-haak D 0
Jin Sun-mee D 0
Kim Yong-ik D 0
Bae Jae-jeung D 1
Baek Kun-ki D 0
Nam In-soon D 1
Kim Kwang-jin D 2
Han Jeoung-ae D 1
Kim Gi-juhn D 0
Chang Ha-na D 3
Kim Ki-sik D 0
Han Myeong-sook D 1
Do Jong-hwan D 0
Kim Hyun D 1
Jin Sung-joon D 0
Choi Min-hee D 0
Hong Eui-rak D 1
Lim Su-kyung D 1
Shin Moon-sik D 0
Lee Seoki U 0
Kim Jae-yeon U 0
Jeong Jin-hoo U→J 2
Kim Je-nam U→J 2
Park Won-suk U→J 1
Seo Gi-ho U→J 1
20th
Chung Sye-kyun D Seoul Jongno 6848 134673 0.05084909 119 5
Hong Ihk-pyo D Jung Seongdong 1 9376 194024 0.04832392 0 2
Ji Sang-wook L→B Jung Seongdong 2 7215 177591 0.04062706 9 0
Chin Young D Yongsan 9499 198065 0.047959 2 1
Jeon Hye-sook D Gwangjin 1 8966 153350 0.05846756 0 4
Choo Mi-ae D Gwangjin 2 7309 153430 0.04763736 0 2
Ahn Gyu-baek D Dongdaemun 1 6764 155682 0.04344754 0 3
Min Byung-doo D Dongdaemun 2 7766 147324 0.05271375 0 1
Seo Young-kyo D Jungnang 1 7359 158416 0.04645364 0 2
Park Hong-keun D Jungnang 2 10159 193567 0.05248312 0 2
You Seung-hee D Seongbuk 1 11999 201468 0.05955785 0 3
Ki Dong-min D Seongbuk 2 9711 172427 0.05631949 0 8
Cheong Yang-seog L→B→L Gangbuk 1 6447 141115 0.04568614 2 1
Park Yong-jin D Gangbuk 2 7980 139687 0.05712772 0 1
In Jae-keun D Dobong 1 8524 142685 0.05973999 0 2
Kim Seon-dong L Dobong 2 8598 150342 0.05718961 0 0
Koh Yong-jin D Nowon 1 7990 138601 0.05764749 0 1
Woo Won-shik D Nowon 2 16480 165508 0.09957223 0 10
Ahn Cheol-soo P Nowon 3 10459 153149 0.06829297 1 4
Cho 57 
Kim Seong-hwan D
Park Joo-min D Eunpyeong 1 11504 201714 0.05703124 0 14
Kang Byeong-won D Eunpyeong 2 12649 210129 0.06019636 1 3
Woo Sang-ho D Seodaemun 1 6347 129698 0.04893676 0 11
Kim Yeong-ho D Seodaemun 2 8036 137934 0.05825975 0 6
Noh Woong-rae D Mapo 1 6243 130686 0.04777099 2 2
Sohn Hye-won D Mapo 2 10085 187317 0.05383921 5 2
Hwang Hee D Yangcheon 1 20061 203511 0.09857452 0 3
Kim Yong-tae L→B→L Yangcheon 2 11016 179994 0.06120204 0 2
Geum Tae-seop D Gangseo 1 10585 173315 0.06107377 0 1
Kim Sung-tae L→B→L Gangseo 2 8163 176035 0.04637146 1 1
Han Jeoung-ae D Gangseo 3 8472 157745 0.05370693 0 1
Lee In-young D Guro 1 10768 196837 0.05470516 0 3
Park Young-sun D Guro 2 6868 150045 0.04577293 1 1
Lee Hoon D Geumcheon 9726 203999 0.0476767 1 2
Kim Young-joo D Yeongdeungpo 1 7633 179245 0.04258417 0 1
Shin Kyoung-min D Yeongdeungpo 2 6812 137971 0.04937269 37 2
Kim Byung-kee D Dongjak 1 10086 181900 0.05544805 0 1
Na Kyung-won L Dongjak 2 6126 157758 0.03883163 0 -1
Kim Sung-shik P→B Gwanak 1 9234 234914 0.039308 3 2
Oh Shin-hwan L→B Gwanak 2 8629 209490 0.04119051 0 1
Lee Hye-hoon L→B Seocho 1 13284 162599 0.08169792 0 0
Park Seong-joong L→B→L Seocho 2 11430 196408 0.05819519 1 0
Lee Jong-gu L→B→L Gangnam 1 9063 165697 0.05469622 1 2
Jun Hyeon-hee D Gangnam 2 9477 142940 0.06630055 0 2
Lee Eun-jae L→B→L Gangnam 3 15628 150784 0.10364495 0 0
Park In-sook L→B→L Songpa 1 10293 164210 0.06268193 1 1
Choi Myeong-gil D→P Songpa 2 10639 173160 0.06144029 1 0
Choi Jae-seong D
Nam In-soon D Songpa 3 13762 213835 0.06435803 1 5
Jin Sun-mee D Gangdong 1 13634 197954 0.06887459 0 6
Shim Jae-kwon D Gangdong 2 8424 168187 0.05008711 0 1
Kim Moo-sung L→B→L Busan Jung Yeongdo 6769 148742 0.04550833 5 0
Yoo Ki-june L Seo Dong 7913 176302 0.04488321 7 0
Kim Young-choon D Busanjin 1 8514 162562 0.05237386 6 2
Lee Hun-seung L Busanjin 2 7147 158762 0.04501707 12 0
Lee Jin-bok L→B→L Dongnae 14693 226881 0.06476082 7 0
Kim Jung-hoon L Nam 1 6577 118049 0.05571415 5 0
Park Jae-ho D Nam 2 7266 113828 0.06383315 5 1
Chun Jae-soo D Buk Gangseo 1 7254 144421 0.05022815 5 2
Kim Do-eup L Buk Gangseo 2 12657 202391 0.06253737 5 0
Ha Tae-keung L→B Haeundae 1 13276 184908 0.07179787 7 5
Bae Duk-kwang L Haeundae 2 10455 156447 0.06682774 5 0
Yun Jun-ho D
Choi In-ho D Saha 1 6996 123334 0.05672402 6 2
Cho Kyoung-tae L Saha 2 9695 158274 0.06125453 6 0
Kim Se-yeon L→B→L Geumjeong 11560 210704 0.0548637 6 2
Kim Hae-young D Yeonje 9747 175168 0.05564372 9 4
Yoo Jae-jung L Suyeong 7498 156376 0.04794853 7 -1
Chang Jae-won L→B→L Sasang 10083 197267 0.05111347 6 2
Yoon Sang-jik L Gijang 7952 126916 0.06265561 6 0
Kwak Sang-do L Daegu Jung Nam 9383 203096 0.04619983 13 0
Chong Jong-sup L Dong 1 5967 128811 0.04632368 2 0
Yoo Seong-min L→B Dong 2 9893 164892 0.05999685 2 10
Kim Sang-hoon L Seo 8328 169207 0.04921782 2 0
Jeong Tae-ok L Buk 1 9585 161768 0.05925152 2 -4
Hong Eui-rak D Buk 2 17654 197169 0.0895374 2 1
Kim Boo-kyum D Suseong 1 22272 199863 0.11143633 2 1
Joo Ho-young L→B→L Suseong 2 10705 153156 0.06989605 2 0
Kwak Dae-hoon L Dalseo 1 11486 143365 0.08011718 2 0
Yoon Jae-ok L Dalseo 2 16855 194291 0.08675132 3 0
Cho Won-jin L→O Dalseo 3 7671 135285 0.05670252 2 0
Choo Kyung-ho L Dalseong 11843 193493 0.06120635 2 0
Ahn Sang-soo L Incheon Jung Dong Ganghwa Ongjin 12215 235239 0.05192591 4 -1
Hong Il-pyo L→B→L Nam 1 8445 170406 0.04955811 3 1
Yoon Sang-hyun L Nam 2 11051 184244 0.05998024 3 0
Park Chan-dae D Yeonsu 1 8654 130726 0.06619953 3 4
Min Kyung-wook L Yeonsu 2 12525 134734 0.09296095 4 0
Park Nam-choon D Namdong 1 14452 214170 0.06747911 5 10
Maeng Seong-kyu D
Youn Kwan-suk D Namdong 2 14446 223046 0.06476691 3 8
Jung Yu-seok L Bupyeong 1 12613 238764 0.05282622 6 -2
Hong Young-pyo D Bupyeong 2 15701 211905 0.07409452 3 3
Yu Dong-su D Gyeyang 1 8956 125048 0.0716205 3 1
Song Young-gil D Gyeyang 2 9327 144421 0.06458202 3 1
Lee Hag-jae L→B→L Seo 1 14165 203371 0.06965103 3 1
Shin Dong-kun D Seo 2 16462 206877 0.07957385 3 1
Chang Byoung-wan P Gwangju Dong Nam 1 11164 134028 0.08329603 8 7
Park Joo-sun P→B Dong Nam 2 6942 125997 0.05509655 28 2
Song Gi-seok P Seo 1 9432 125432 0.07519612 9 0
Song Gap-seok D
Chun Jung-bae P Seo 2 11518 121888 0.09449659 8 6
Kim Gyeong-jin P→I Buk 1 9508 156423 0.0607839 8 4
Choi Gyeong-hwan P Buk 2 18010 200782 0.08969928 8 5
Kim Dong-cheol P→B Gwangsan 1 10811 134796 0.08020268 10 4
Gwon Eun-hui P→B Gwangsan 2 19576 170572 0.11476678 9 1
Lee Jang-woo L Daejeon Dong 11619 192460 0.06037099 2 0
Lee Eun-gwon L Jung 14025 206839 0.06780636 2 0
Cho 58 
 
Park Byeong-seog D Seo 1 15141 204688 0.07397112 3 2
Park Beom-kye D Seo 2 15471 189224 0.08176024 10 1
Jo Seung-rae D Yuseong 1 9156 142566 0.06422289 2 1
Lee Sang-min D Yuseong 2 12358 128985 0.09580959 3 2
Jeong Yong-ki L Dadeok 11270 154613 0.07289167 2 -1
Jeong Kab-yoon L Ulsan Jung 12958 196657 0.06589137 0 0
Lee Chae-ik L Nam 1 11965 149365 0.08010578 1 0
Bak Maeng-woo L Nam 2 8619 126022 0.06839282 3 0
Kim Jong-hoon I→M Dong 8719 135890 0.06416219 0 4
Yoon Jong-oh I→M Buk 11999 155172 0.0773271 0 1
Lee Sang-heon D
Kang Ghil-boo L→B→L Ulju 13190 178169 0.07403084 0 0
Lee Hae-chan D Sejong 14969 210567 0.07108901 1 2
0
Lee Chan-yeol L→B→L Gyeonggi Suwon 1 15673 202809 0.07727961 2 2
Baek Hye-ryun D Suwon 2 13428 195967 0.06852174 2 2
Kim Yeong-jin D Suwon 3 9593 164467 0.05832781 4 5
Park Kwang-on D Suwon 4
Kim Jin-pyo D Suwon 5
Kim Tae-nyeon D Seongnam Sujeong 10221 202546 0.05046261 1 2
Shin Sang-jin L Jungwon 11116 195443 0.05687592 1 0
Kim Byung-gwan D Bundang 1 16441 206177 0.07974216 1 6
Kim Byung-uk D Bundang 2 15272 195293 0.07820045 1 2
Moon Hee-sang D Uijeongbu 1 9871 171166 0.05766916 2 1
Hong Mun-jong L→O Uijeongbu 2 15409 192724 0.07995372 2 0
Lee Jong-kul D Anyang Manan 12497 216066 0.05783881 1 2
Lee Seok-hyun D Dongan 1 9940 145059 0.06852384 1 1
Shim Jae-chul L Dongan 2 11339 124167 0.09132056 1 -1
Kim Gyeong-hyeop D Bucheon Wonmi 1 7302 141909 0.05145551 2 4
Sul Hoon D Wonmi 2 15766 218394 0.07219063 2 2
Kim Sang-hee D Sosa 11202 218394 0.05129262 2 5
Won Hye-young D Ojeong 10071 152536 0.06602376 2 4
Baek Jae-hyun D Gwangmyeong 1 7512 121685 0.06173316 1 5
Lee Un-ju D→P→B Gwangmyeong 2 11605 148329 0.07823824 1 1
Won Yoo-chul L Pyeongtaek 1 10753 149000 0.07216779 2 0
Yoo Ui-dong L→B Pyeongtaek 2 17175 237740 0.07224279 2 0
Kim Seong-won L Dongducheon Yeoncheon 7261 119000 0.06101681 1 0
Jeon Hae-cheol D Ansan Sangnok 1 13554 170276 0.07960018 2 3
Kim Cheol-min D Sangnok 2 9853 133815 0.07363151 2 1
Kim Myung-yeon L Danwon 1 10157 135547 0.07493342 2 0
Park Sun-ja L→B→L Danwon 2 9724 114605 0.08484796 3 0
Sim Sang-jung J Goyang 1 18450 268444 0.06872942 2 28
Jung Jae-ho D Goyang 2 7593 126015 0.06025473 2 2
Yoo Eun-hae D Goyang 3 17126 233685 0.07328669 2 4
Kim Hyun-mee D Goyang 4 19749 222042 0.08894263 2 1
Shin Chang-hyeon D Uiwang Gwacheon 12429 175206 0.07093935 2 2
Yun Ho-jung D Guri 11414 163803 0.06968126 1 8
Cho Eung-chun D Namyangju 1 13263 162768 0.08148408 1 1
Kim Han-jeong D Namyangju 2 13926 188471 0.07388935 1 2
Joo Kwang-deok L Namyangju 3 12251 177778 0.06891179 1 -1
An Min-suk D Osan 12353 164626 0.07503675 1 2
Ham Jin-kyu L Siheung 1 14665 174040 0.08426224 1 0
Cho Jeong-sik D Siheung 2 11490 161638 0.07108477 1 2
Kim Jeong-woo D Gunpo 1 7383 114185 0.06465823 1 4
Lee Hak-yeong D Gunpo 2 8948 113951 0.07852498 2 1
Lee Hyun-jae L Hanam 10341 187871 0.05504309 1 1
Lee Woo-hyun L Yongin 1 12907 188955 0.06830727 1 0
Kim Min-gi D Yongin 2 13229 178614 0.07406474 1 2
Han Sun-kyo L Yongin 3 18837 212321 0.08871944 1 0
Pyo Chang-won D Yongin 4 17923 205554 0.08719363 1 12
Yoon Hu-duk D Paju 1 15620 192650 0.08107968 2 4
Park Jeong D Paju 2 9425 154648 0.06094486 2 3
Song Seok-jun L Icheon 12541 170227 0.07367221 1 0
Kim Hak-yong L→B→L Anseong 10028 149052 0.06727853 1 1
Kim Doo-kwan D Gimpo 1 11479 151235 0.07590174 2 2
Hong Chul-ho L→B→L Gimpo 2 8993 155079 0.0579898 2 0
Seo Chung-won L→I Hwaseong 1 9435 169222 0.05575516 2 0
Lee Won-uk D Hwaseong 2 15089 172688 0.08737724 3 1
Kwon Chil-seung D Hwaseong 3 14843 180773 0.0821085 2 2
So Byeong-hun D Gwangju 1 8925 140670 0.06344636 1 6
Im Jong-seong D Gwangju 2 8128 140393 0.05789462 1 2
Jung Sung-ho D Yangju 12660 170100 0.07442681 1 3
Kim Young-woo L→B→L Pocheon Gapyeong 11076 183092 0.06049418 3 0
Choung Byoung-gug L→B Yeoju Yangpyeong 10749 191871 0.05602201 2 2
Kim Jin-tae L Gangwon Chuncheon 16268 230694 0.07051766 7 -1
Kim Ki-sun L Wonju 1 9187 135611 0.06774524 7 0
Song Ki-hun D Wonju 2 11252 141705 0.0794044 4 2
Kweon Seong-dong L Gangneung 11864 179736 0.06600792 1 -2
Lee Chul-gyu L→B→L Donghae Samcheok 8637 135272 0.06384913 0 0
Yeom Dong-yeol L Taebaek Hoengseong Yeongwol Pyeongchang Jeongseon 10077 185031 0.05446114 2 0
Lee Yang-su L Sokcho Goseong Yangyang 7210 118944 0.06061676 0 0
Hwang Young-cheul L→B→L Hongcheon Cheorwon Hwacheon Yanggu Inje 9648 168958 0.05710295 1 1
Chung Woo-taik L Chungbuk Cheongju Sangdang 10840 139460 0.07772838 9 0
Oh Jae-sae D Seowon 13715 174761 0.07847861 3 3
Do Jong-hwan D Heungdeok 15212 203768 0.07465353 3 1
Byun Jae-il D Cheongwon 10264 152643 0.06724187 2 1
Lee Jong-bae L Chungju 11487 173813 0.06608827 2 0
Gwon Seok-chang L Jecheon Danyang 8612 141270 0.06096128 1 0
Lee Hu-sam D
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Park Deok-heum L Boeun Okcheon Yeongdong Goesan 7366 153979 0.04783769 1 -1
Kyung Dae-soo L Jeungpyeong Jincheon Eumseong 10363 172165 0.06019226 1 0
Park Chan-woo L Chungnam Cheonan 1 9628 166617 0.05778522 5 0
Lee Gyu-hee D 1
Park Wan-ju D Cheonan 2 15683 196173 0.07994474 3 5
Yang Seoung-jo D Cheonan 3 12579 138779 0.09064051 3 2
Yun Il-gyu D
Chung Jin-suk L Gongju Buyeo Cheongyang 9787 182937 0.05349929 1 0
Kim Tae-heum L Boryeong Seocheon 8534 136160 0.06267626 1 0
Lee Myoung-soo L Asan 1 9541 125179 0.07621885 3 0
Kang Hun-sik D Asan 2 7583 117308 0.0646418 2 4
Sung Il-jong L Seosan Taean 12492 194140 0.06434532 2 -1
Kim Jong-min D Nonsan Gyeryong Geumsan 12426 183067 0.06787679 0 4
Eo Ki-kyu D Dangjin 8082 135292 0.05973746 3 3
Hong Moon-pyo L→B→L Hongseong Yesan 8801 154173 0.05708522 4 0
Kim Gwang-su P Jeonbuk Jeonju 1 10935 146611 0.07458513 11 5
Chung Woon-chun L→B Jeonju 2 15958 169535 0.09412806 2 1
Chung Dong-young P Jeonju 3 16310 204256 0.07985078 2 9
Kim Kwan-young P→B Gunsan 15931 223306 0.07134157 6 9
Lee Choon-suak D Iksan 1 7013 119431 0.0587201 1 1
Cho Bae-sook P Iksan 2 10779 127664 0.08443257 1 3
You Sung-yop P Jeongeup Gochang 9403 148387 0.06336808 1 3
Lee Yong-ho P→I Namwon Imsil Sunchang 7033 121968 0.05766267 3 3
Kim Jong-hoe P Gimje Buan 6413 124095 0.05167815 3 3
An Ho-young D Wanju Jinan Muju Jangsu 7564 143216 0.05281533 2 1
Park Jie-won P Jeonnam Mokpo 15225 186999 0.08141755 0 9
Lee Yong-ju P Yeosu 1 6982 116574 0.05989329 3 2
Joo Seung-yong P Yeosu 2 9792 118685 0.08250411 2 5
Lee Jung-hyun L→I Suncheon 18384 224182 0.0820048 0 -1
Son Kum-ju P→D Naju Hwasun 8370 146468 0.05714559 0 1
Jeong In-hwa P→I Gwangyang Gokseong Gurye 12658 174631 0.07248427 1 3
Lee Kai-ho D Damyang Hampyeong Yeonggwang Jangseong 7872 153484 0.05128873 1 1
Hwang Ju-hong P Goheung Boseong Jangheung Gangjin 7973 165070 0.04830072 1 3
Yoon Young-il P Haenam Wando Jindo 7184 135196 0.05313767 0 1
Park Jun-yeong P Yeongam Muan Sinan 8977 151348 0.05931363 0 1
Seo Sam-seok D
Kim Jeong-jae L Gyeongbuk Pohang Buk 15414 222587 0.06924933 2 0
Park Myung-jae L Nam Ulleung 13230 208926 0.06332386 1 1
Kim Seok-ki L Gyeongju 13178 218295 0.06036785 1 0
Lee Cheol-uoo L Gimcheon 7107 119791 0.05932833 1 -1
Song Eon-seok L
Kim Kwang-lim L Andong 8411 139486 0.06029996 2 0
Baek Seung-joo L Gumi 1 15343 176777 0.08679297 4 0
Chang Seok-chun L Gumi 2 11409 154397 0.07389392 3 0
Choi Gyo-il L Yeongju Mungyeong Yecheon 11058 197292 0.0560489 1 0
Lee Man-hee L Yeongcheon Cheongdo 5482 127308 0.04306092 1 0
Kim Jong-tae L Sangju Gunwi Uiseong Cheongsong 7597 182244 0.04168587 1 0
Kim Jae-won L 7597 182244 0.04168587 1 -1
Choi Kyoung-hwan L Gyeongsan 13087 215007 0.06086779 1 0
Kang Seok-ho L Yeongyang Yeongdeok Bonghwa Uljin 5662 123091 0.04599849 1 0
Yi Wan-young L Goryeong Seongju Chilgok 9541 167539 0.05694793 1 0
Park Wan-su L Gyeongnam Changwon Uichang 14149 209198 0.06763449 31 0
Roh Hoe-chan J Seongsan 15729 183250 0.08583356 19 10
Yeo Yeong-gug J
Lee Ju-young L Masanhappo 8348 154027 0.05419829 14 0
Yoon Han-hong L Masanhoewon 11286 168692 0.06690299 14 0
Kim Sung-chan L Jinhae 10778 148455 0.07260112 13 1
Park Dae-chul L Jinju 1 11175 149892 0.07455368 14 0
Kim Jae-kyung L→B→L Jinju 2 9388 131912 0.07116866 17 0
Lee Gun-hyeon L→B→L Tongyeong Goseong 9573 157514 0.06077555 15 0
Jeong Jeom-sik L
Yeo Sang-gyu L→B→L Sacheon Namhae Hadong 9545 177414 0.05380071 15 0
Min Hong-chul D Gimhae 1 16957 227872 0.07441458 13 1
Kim Kyung-soo D Gimhae 2 18289 190244 0.09613444 14 1
Kim Jeong-ho D
Um Yong-su L Miryang Uiryeong Haman Changnyeong 12055 231174 0.05214687 14 0
Kim Han-pyo L Geoje 15346 195466 0.07850982 13 0
Yoon Young-suk L Yangsan 1 8781 140382 0.06255075 13 0
Seo Hyung-soo D Yangsan 2 9275 130217 0.07122726 13 2
Kang Seok-jin L Sancheong Hamyang Geochang Hapcheon 8254 162607 0.05076042 15 0
Kang Chang-il D Jeju Jeju 1 15487 198688 0.07794633 15 2
Oh Young-hun D Jeju 2 14325 180929 0.0791747 18 1
Wi Seong-gon D Seogwipo 9359 146722 0.0637873 8 5
Park Kyung-mi D Proportional Rep. 2808136 42678353 0.06579767 48 2
Kim Chong-in D 0
Song Ok-ju D 2
Choi Woon-yeol D 2
Lee Jae-jeong D 14
Kim Hyun-kwon D 2
Moon Mi-ok D 1
Lee Chul-hee D 5
Je Youn-kyung D 6
Kim Sung-soo D 1
Kwon Mi-hyuk D 2
Lee Yong-deuk D 2




Shim Gi-jun D 1
Lee Su-hyeok D 1
Jung Eun-hye D 1
Song Hee-kyung L 0
Lee Jong-myung L 0
Lim Lee-ja L 0
Moon Jin-guk L 0
Choi Yeon-hye L 0
Kim Gyu-hwan L 0
Shin Bo-ra L 1
Kim Sung-tae L 0
Jeon Hee-gyeong L 0
Kim Jong-suk L 0
Kim Seung-hee L 0
Yoo Min-bong L 0
Yun Jong-pil L 0
Cho Hoon-hyun L 0
Kim Sun-rye L 0
Kang Hyo-sang L 0
Kim Hyun-ah L 0
Shin Yong-hyeon P 0
Oh Se-jung P 1
Park Joo-hyun P 3
Lee Sang-don P 2
Park Sun-sook P 1
Chae Yi-bae P 5
Kim Su-min P -1
Lee Tae-gyu P -1
Kim San-hwa P 0
Kim Jung-ro P -1
Chang Jeong-suk P 6
Lee Dong-seop P 2
Choi Do-ja P 3
Lim Jae-hoon P 1
Lee Jung-mi J 11
Kim Jong-dae J 4
Chu Hye-seon J 4
Yun So-ha J 7
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Appendix B: Original Korean 
Search Keywords 
청소년 시위 Youth Protest 
청소년 집회 Youth Rally 
중/고등학생 시위 Middle / High School Student Protest 
청소년 참여 Youth Involvement 
청소년 단체 Youth Organization 
 Lawmaker Remarks 
“그리고 실제로 거기 나와서 많은 문제 제기를 하는 우리 청년들, 18 세 이하의 학생들조차도 
저보다 훨씬 나은 것 같아요, 학생들의 그 발언 내용이나 행동하는 거나 이런 것을 보면.” 
“The questions raised by the youths [at protests], their speech and act are even better than mine.” 
“촛불광장에서 우리 청소년들은 충분히 시민적 능력을 증명했다.” 
“Youths have enough proven their civic capacity at the vigil.” 
“이 법안은 국민의 참정권 확대를 위한 법안이다. 선거 룰을 대하듯 정치적 유불리를 따져 반대할 
내용이 아니다.” 
“This bill is about suffrage. This is not something you oppose because of your political interests, 
as if it is a change to a random election rule.” 
Interview Questions and Responses 
대한민국 국회 심상정 의원실 귀중 
안녕하세요, 저는 미시간 대학교에서 “청소년 참여와 선거연령: 대한민국을 중심으로”를 주제로 
졸업논문을 쓰고 있는 조성민이라고 합니다. 전대 국회에서 선거연령 하향 법안들을 꾸준히 
지지하신 의원님께 몇 가지 질문을 여쭈고자 연락을 드립니다. 간단한 서면 인터뷰에 응해주실 수 
있으시다면 회신해주시면 감사하겠습니다. 
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Hello, I am Sungmin Cho, a University of Michigan student writing a political science thesis 
“Youth Involvement and Voting Age: Evidence from South Korea.” Since you had advocated the 
bills lowering the voting age, I am reaching out to ask questions regarding this issue. If you are 
willing to participate in a short written interview, please feel free to respond to this email. 
1. 선거권이 없는 청소년도 유권자로 생각하십니까? 만약 그렇다면 이유는 무엇입니까? 
1. Do you consider youths (minors) as your constituents? Why or why not? 
선거권이 없는 청소년은 법적으로 유권자는 아닙니다. 다만 이들도 예비 유권자이자 미래 
유권자로서 앞 세대나 교사의 개입 없이 자치 조직을 결성하고 운영할 수 있는 잠재력을 
갖추고 있습니다. 그런 잠재력이 발휘될 수 있도록 사회와 앞 세대가 지원해야 합니다. 
이들도 학교 학생회 등을 통해 학생 자치를 경험하고, 학교 운영에 참여할 수 있어야 
합니다. 민주주의의 기본 원칙은 자신이 속한 공동체의 운영에 구성원 모두가 참여하는 
것이고, 그것을 청소년기부터 익히는 것이 미래의 적극적인 유권자가 되는 첫걸음입니다. 
Legal minors are not constituents. However, as future constituents, they possess the 
potential to organize independently from the older generation or teachers. The older 
generation and society in general should encourage them to develop such potential. 
Youths have to be able to experience student autonomy through student governments and 
participate in administrative activities. The basic principle of democracy is everyone 
engaging in the operation of their own communities, and actively participating from 
adolescence is the first step toward becoming an active future constituent. 
2. 선거연령 하향을 지지하신 이유는 무엇입니까? 
2. What were your reasons behind advocating the voting age bills? 
저는 2017 년 대선에 출마해 만 18 세로 선거연령을 하향해야 한다고 역설했습니다. 그 
이유는 다음과 같습니다. 첫째, 만 18 세가 되면 국방, 납세, 근로, 교육의 의무가 
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부과되지만 참정권은 인정받지 못합니다. 이것은 의무와 권리의 비례원칙에 맞지 
않습니다. 둘째, 청소년보호법은 18 세를 보호대상에서 제외하고, 병역법과 공무원 임용 
시험령은 병역의무와 공무담임권을 부여하고 있는데 참정권은 부여하지 않았습니다. 이는 
법규정의 일관성에도 어긋나는 일이었습니다. 셋째, 18 세 청소년에게 선거권을 주지 않는 
것은 18 세의 정치적 권리를 침해하는 것은 물론이고 한국 민주주의의 발전에도 도움이 
되지 않는다고 생각했습니다. 저희는 선거권과 피선거권의 확대야 말로 민주주의 발전의 
기본 조건이라고 생각합니다. 넷째, 고령화 시대에 노인인구의 과잉 대표와 청소년 인구의 
과소 대표로 인한 세대불균형도 해소해야 한다고 생각했습니다. 
As a presidential candidate in the 2017 election, I advocated that the voting age should be 
lowered to 18. Here’s why. First, the duties of national defense, taxation, labor, and 
education are conferred upon 18th birthday, but not the political rights. Such a 
discrepancy violates the principle of proportionality of duties and rights. Second, the 
Youth Protection Act excludes 18-year-olds from youths. The Military Service Act and 
the Decree on Public Officials Appointment Examination respectively confer the 
obligation of military service and the right to hold public offices. Their 
disenfranchisement was also inconsistent with the existing laws. Third, disenfranchising 
the 18-year-olds not only infringes on their political rights but also undermines the 
advancement of our democracy. We think that the expansion of rights to vote and run for 
offices are the basic conditions of democratic advancement. Lastly, we thought that the 
overrepresentation of the old population and the underrepresentation of the youth 
population also had to be addressed, in light of aging South Korea today. 
3. 집회 참가 등 청소년의 사회 참여가 활발할 때마다 어떤 경로로 이것을 알게 되셨습니까? 
3. Through what channel did you learn about youth involvement, whenever prevalent? 
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저도 한때 청소년을 자녀로 둔 어른입니다. 미래 세대는 사회 변화를 위한 참신한 
아이디어의 원천이고 사회 변화의 추진력 자체입니다. 정의당이 관계를 맺어온 다양한 
청소년 단체들과 개인들, 제가 4 선 국회의원으로 활동해오면서 지속적으로 관계를 맺어온 
청소년 단체들과 개인들, 제 지역구인 덕양구의 다양한 청소년 단체들과 개인들로부터 
청소년 세계를 배우고 이해할 수 있었습니다. 그들과 접하면서 세대 간의 차이와 소통 
방법에 대해 배워왔습니다. 이런 네트워크를 통해 청소년들의 사회참여와 정치참여와 
관련한 다양한 정보를 접해왔고, 이런 사회참여와 정치참여의 활성화 방안에 대해 같이 
고민해왔습니다. 
My son was once a youth as well. The future generation is the pool of fresh ideas for 
reforms and the momentum of social change by itself. [I] was able to learn and 
understand the world of youths from the various youth organizations and individuals the 
Justice Party and I have been interacting with as a fourth-term National Assembly 
member, and in my constituency Deogyang.1 Interacting with them, I have learned about 
the generational differences and ways to communicate. Such networks provided diverse 
information on youth involvement, and I have been working together with them to further 
promote youth involvement. 
4. 사회에 참여하는 청소년과 어떤 교류를 하셨습니까? 
4. How had you communicated with youths that were involved in social movements? 
제 의원실과 제 지역 사무소로 다양한 청소년 단체들과 개인들이 여러 사안들과 관련해서, 
요청을 보내옵니다. 청소년 선거권 단체, 청소년 환경 단체, 청소년 인권 단체, 청소년 
이주노동자 지원 단체, 청소년 노동권 단체 등등 여러 단체들이 저의 의견을 묻기도 하고, 
자신들의 요구사항을 전하기도 하고, 자신들의 활동에 대한 지지를 요청하기도 합니다. 
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청소년 개인이 직접 메일이나 편지를 보내거나 저의 사무실을 직접 방문해서 자신들의 
제안을 전하기도 합니다. 
A wide variety of youth organizations and individuals contact my National Assembly and 
district offices regarding many issues. The youth suffrage organizations, youth-led 
environmental organizations, youth rights organizations, youth-led immigrant support 
groups, and youth labor rights organizations ask for my opinion, exert their opinion, and 
ask for my support. Youth individuals sometimes email or mail me or visit my offices 
with their suggestions. 
5. 청소년의 사회 참여가 선거연령 하향에 대한 생각에 어떤 영향을 주었습니까? 
5. How had youth involvement influenced your thoughts on lowering the voting age? 
청소년의 사회참여와 정치참여는 선거연령 하향에 아주 큰 영향을 미쳤습니다. 지금의 
40 대와 50 대 성인들은, 자신들이 청소년이었던 80 년대 후반기와 90 년대 전반기에 
고등학교 학생회를 자율적으로 구성하고, 학생회를 직접 운영해본 첫 번째 세대입니다. 
87 년 민주화 이후에 민주주의가 사회적으로 확산되어가는 데 기여한 세대인 것입니다. 
이들은 한국 민주주의의 지지기반이자, 청소년들의 사회참여와 정치참여에 대한 강력한 
지지세력이기도 합니다. 현재의 청소년들도 2016 년 말과 2017 년 초의 촛불 혁명에 직접 
참여하거나 강력한 지지를 보냈습니다. 그들의 사회참여가 결국 18 세로 선거연령을 
하향하는 데 결정적으로 기여했습니다. 
Youth involvement significantly affected the lowering of the voting age. South Koreans 
in their 40s and 50s are the first generation that ran the autonomously organized student 
governments from the late 1980s to the early 1990s when they were youths themselves. 
They contributed to the spread of democracy to the entire society after the 
democratization in 1987. They are the bedrock of South Korean democracy and youth 
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involvement. Youths today also directly participated in or sent strong support to the 
2016-2017 vigils. Their involvement eventually contributed to lowering the voting age in 
a decisive manner. 
6. 제 19~20 대 국회에서 발의된 선거연령 하향 법안 20 건 중 마지막인 2019 년 안만 유일하게 
본회의를 통과했습니다. 당시 통과를 이끌어낸 특수한 요인이 무엇이라고 생각하십니까? 
6. Among the 20 voting age bills introduced by the 19th and 20th National Assembly, only the 
final 2019 bill passed. What do you think were the factors that led to the passage? 
저와 정의당은 2000 년 창당 이래로 일관되게 선거연령 하향을 주장해왔습니다. 그런데 
2019 년 말에 선거연령 하향에 관한 법이 통과된 것에는 두 가지 이유가 있습니다. 첫째, 
국민들이 선거연령 하향에 대해 높은 지지를 보냈다는 것입니다. 당시 국민들의 지지가 
높았던 이유는 무엇보다도 촛불 혁명 때문이었습니다. 국민들의 정치적 관심이 매우 
높아졌고, 당사자인 청소년들의 사회와 정치에 대한 관심도 높았기 때문에 보수정당의 
반대를 극복하고 법안을 통과시킬 수 있었습니다. 둘째, 2018 년과 2019 년 동안에 제가 
국회 정치개혁특별위원회의 위원장을 맡았기 때문이었습니다. 정의당 소속 의원이 
국회에서 상설위원회나 특별위원회의 위원장을 맡은 것은 그것이 처음이자 
마지막이었습니다. 당시 저는 정치학자들과 청소년단체들과의 긴밀한 네트워크를 
만들고, 전국적인 선거연령하향 캠페인에 동참했습니다. 국회 내에서는 특별위원회 
위원장이었지만, 정의당은 당시 전체 300석 가운데 6석의 소수 의석 정당에 
불과했습니다. 따라서 국회에서 부족한 정치적 힘을 국회 밖의 국민들의 지지로 보완해야 
했습니다. 
The Party and I had consistently demanded to lower the voting age ever since it was 
founded in 2000. But there are two main reasons the bill was passed in late 2019. First, 
the public support toward lowering the voting age was high. This was due to the 2016-
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2017 vigils. Because the general public as well as the youths (dangsaja) had become 
extremely politically active, we were able to pass it despite the conservative resistance. 
Second, I was the Special Committee on Political Reform Chair between 2018 and 2019. 
This was the first and last time a Justice Party member chaired a committee, special or 
standing. At that time, I built a close network with political scientists and youth 
organizations and joined the nationwide campaign to lower the voting age. Although I 
was the Chair of a special committee, Justice Party had only six seats. Therefore, we had 
to complement the lacking political party within the National Assembly with the extra-





1. Unlike most political science literature that defines youths as young adults, typically in their 
early twenties, youth in this study always refers to anyone below the voting age. This study 
concerns genuinely spontaneous, politically active youths. 
2. Unlike the US, the voting age is determined by a statute called the Public Official Election Act 
in South Korea. The South Korean Constitution once stipulated voting age, but the 1987 
amendment which stands as of December 2019 excluded this clause (NLIC 1960). This 
conferred the authority to set the voting age to the statutory level. 
3. Contemporary South Korean names will be written in the original order, the family name 
followed by the hyphenated given name, which is now conventional for English speakers. This 
does not apply to the bibliography and some exceptions. 
4. The term “lawmaker” is intended to translate gukhoe-uiwon [National Assembly member], 
suited to reflect the unicameral characteristics. Besides when it concerns distinct South Korean 
contexts, this study uses political terms that are most familiar to English speakers. 
5. The Republic of Korea does not officially endorse the prevalent English name “South Korea” 
because Article 3 of the Constitution recognizes that the territory “shall consist of the Korean 
peninsula and its adjacent islands.” The name “South Korea” implicitly legitimizes North Korea, 
which is an unconstitutional institution. However, this study uses this name which is familiar to 
English speakers. 
I. Background 
1. While this is about the National Assembly election, a similar change was adopted to the 
gubernatorial level two years earlier, due to 2000HeonMa91, 112, 134; Supreme Court (2001) 
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that struck down the previous one-person-one-vote principle. This is neither the most recent 
version: the National Assembly election moved to quasi-mixed-member in 2020. 
2. Then Unified Progressive Party. The Constitutional Court of Korea disbanded the UPP in 
2014 over its pro-North Korea scandal. Some UPP lawmakers retired, others joined the Minjung 
Party, and the others joined the Justice Party, which was the mainstream. Therefore, this study 
considers that Justice de facto succeeded the UPP. 
3. Then Democratic United Party. Name changes are very frequent among South Korean 
political parties. For the sake of brevity, this study addresses parties based on their names on 
December 27, 2019, when the voting age bill eventually passed. 
4. Then Saenuri, the majority party controlling both the presidency and the National Assembly. 
5. Democrats were divided into largely two wings: pro-Kim Dae-jung and pro-Roh Moo-hyun, 
of which leaders respectively served as the 15th and 16th Presidents of South Korea. The pro-
Roh wing had been the Democratic mainstream since the Roh Administration (2003). The pro-
Kim wing is associated with Honam, the southwestern region including Jeollabuk-do, Jeollanam-
do, and Gwangju (Kang and Bae 2018). Their support for Democrats, however, has to do with 
the backlash against the authoritarian vestige in the LKP rather than ideology: the military 
regime had historically excluded Honam from development and violently oppressed its 
democratization movements. People’s provided a centrist alternative and focused on Honam’s 
regional interest. 
6. Then Bareun. 
7. This is the point where Saenuri changed its name to LKP. This, however, did not make the 
LKP solely pro-Park. The LKP remained neutral, and a few extremist lawmakers left to found 
their own pro-Park party, which was too insignificant to be relevant to this study. 
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8. In fact, People’s and Bareun merged to the BMP, and the pro-Kim minority left to found the 
Party for Democracy and Peace. However, since the PDP is the ideological continuity of 
People’s, this study concisely explains that the People’s mainstream joined the BMP, and 
People’s persisted. 
9. All 20 voting age bills were introduced by lawmakers, not the government. 
II. Lowering the Voting Age 
1. Then Democratic Liberal Party. 
2. While the English term “bipartisan” refers to two parties in accord, the Anglo-American two-
party context implies that the more comprehensive meaning should be all parties in accord. The 
term “bipartisan” here is intended to translate a Korean term chodang [beyond partisanship], 
which is a more accurate usage referring to the situation which requires consensus of more than 
two parties. 
III. Youth Involvement in Social Movements 
1. The term “modern” refers to the post-medieval time period as a whole, not limited to the 
current South Korean regime or the post-1987 liberal democracy. 
2. His name is written in the common English order since he was known to the Western world 
before the establishment of the Romanization of Korean. 
3. This study adopts the Revised Romanization of Korean released by the South Korean 
government in 2000. Revised Romanization allows exceptions for names. 
IV. Across-time Study 
1. For instance, a 3.1 memorial event does not count as a social movement by itself, but it does 
once it contains a political statement regarding diplomacy. 
V. Across-politician Study 
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1. Unlike the US, South Korean lawmakers lose their party membership upon their internal 
election to the National Assembly Speaker although they typically remain partisan. Chung Sye-
kyun was technically an independent at the time, but this study disregards this temporary change. 
Appendix 
1. Her constituency during the 19th National Assembly term Deogyang 1 was redistricted to 




Almeida. 2019. “Movement Outcomes.” Social Movements: The Structure of Collective  
Mobilization. University of California Press 
Bergan, Daniel E., and Richard T. Cole. 2015. “Call Your Legislator: A Field Experimental  
Study of the Impact of a Constituency Mobilization Campaign on Legislative Voting.” 
Political Behavior 37(1): 27-42. 
Bishin, Benjamin G. 2004. “Dormant Delegation: Evidence on the Conflicting Findings of  
Research on Legislative Representation.” Polity 36(4): 619-635. 
Branton, Regina, Valerie Martinez-Ebers, Tony E. Carey, Jr. and Tetsuya Matsubayashi. 2015.  
“Social Protest and Policy Attitudes: The Case of the 2006 Immigrant Rallies.” American 
Journal of Political Science 59(2): 390-402. 
Campbell, David, Geoffrey Layman, John Green and Nathanael Samaktoyo. 2018. “Putting  
Politics First: The Impact of Politics on American Religious and Secular Orientations.” 
American Journal of Political Science 55(1): 42-58. 
Duverger, Maurice. 1964. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State.  
London: Methuen. 
Earl, Jennifer, Thomas V. Maher, and Thomas Elliot. 2017. “Youth, Activism, and Social  
Movements.” Sociology Compass 11(4): 1-14. 
Gillion, Daniel Q. 2012. "Protest and Congressional Behavior: Assessing Racial and Ethnic  
Minority Protests in the District.” The Journal of Politics 74(4): 950-962. 
Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, and Michael D. Ward. 2006. “Diffusion and the International Context  
of Democratization.” International Organization 60(4): 911-933. 
  
Cho 73 
Healy, Andrew, and Gabriel S. Lenz. 2014. “Substituting the End for the Whole: Why Voters  
Respond Primarily to the Election-Year Economy.” American Journal of Political 
Science 58(1): 31-47. 
Kang, WooJin, and Jin Seok Bae. 2018. “Regionalism and Party System Change at the Sub- 
national Level: The 2016 Korean National Assembly Election.” Journal of International 
and Area Studies 25(1): 93-112. 
Kim, Gwi-ok. 2003. “Chotbulsiwiui Sahoehak” [Sociology of Vigils]. The Radical Review 5(3):  
412-429. 
Kwon, Soo Ah. 2013. “Introduction.” Uncivil Youth: Race, Activism, and Affirmative  
Governmentality. Duke University Press. 
Linos, Katerina. 2011. “Diffusion through Democracy.” American Journal of Political Science  
55(3): 678- 695. 
Longley, Neil 1998. “Legislative Systems with Absolute Party Discipline: Implications for the  
Agency Theory Approach to the Constituent-Legislator Link.” Public Choice 97(1/2): 
121-140. 
Mazumder, Soumyajit. 2018. “The Persistent Effect of U.S. civil Rights Protests on Political  
Attitudes.” American Journal of Political Science 62(4): 922-935. 
National Assembly of the Republic of Korea. 1992. Jeongchigwangyebeopsimui Teukbyeol- 
wiwonhoe Hoeuirok Je 3-ho [Political Relations Law Review Special Committee Minute 
Vol. 3]. Seoul: National Assembly Secretariat. 
  
Cho 74 





National Law Information Center. 1960. “Daehanminguk Heonbeop” [Constitution].  
https://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=53084&ancYd=19600615&ancNo=00004&ef
Yd=19600615&nwJoYnInfo=N&efGubun=Y&chrClsCd=010202&ancYnChk=0#0000. 
National Law Information Center. 2004. “Act on the Election of Public Officials and the  
Prevention of Election Malpractices.” 
https://www.law.go.kr/LSW//lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=62354&chrClsCd=010203&urlMode=en
gLsInfoR&viewCls=engLsInfoR#0000. 
National Law Information Center. 2005. “Public Official Election Act.”  
https://www.law.go.kr/LSW/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=70230&chrClsCd=010203&urlMode=en
gLsInfoR&viewCls=engLsInfoR#0000. 
National Law Information Center. 2019. “National Assembly Act.”  
https://www.law.go.kr/LSW//lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=208376&chrClsCd=010203&urlMode=e
ngLsInfoR&viewCls=engLsInfoR#0000. 
Nordås, Ragnhild, and Christian Davenport. 2013. “Fight the Youth: Youth Bulges and State  
Repression.” American Journal of Political Science 57(4): 926-940. 
Schumaker, Kathryn. 2019. Troublemakers: Students' Rights and Racial Justice in the Long  
1960s. New York: New York University Press. 
  
Cho 75 
Seok, Seunghye, Ansik Chang, and Doohwan Kim. 2019. “Varieties of Politically Moderate  
Groups in South Korea.” Journal of Asian Sociology 48(1): 139-168. 
Stephens-Dougan, LaFleur. 2016. “Priming Racial Resentment without Stereotypic Cues.” The  
Journal of Politics 78(3): 687-704. 
Takahashi, Keiko, and Kiyoshi Takeuchi. 1993. “Japan.” In: Hurrelmann, Klaus (ed.).  
International Handbook of Adolescence. Westport: Greenwood Press: 234-245. 
Walsh, Katherine Cramer. 2012. “Putting Inequality in Its Place: Rural Consciousness and the  
Power of Perspective.” American Political Science Review 106(3): 517-532. 
Youniss et al. 2002. “Youth Civic Engagement in the Twenty‐First Century.” Journal of  
Research on Adolescence 12(1): 121-148. 
Youth Speak Out Coalition and Zimmerman. 2007. “Making Space, Making Change: Models for 
Youth-Led Social Change Organizations.” Children, Youth and Environments 17(2): 298-
314. 
Zeglovits, Eva, and Martina Zandonella. 2013. “Political interest of adolescents before and after 
lowering the voting age: the case of Austria.” Journal of Youth Studies 16(8): 1084-1104. 
